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ARTICLES
ILLUSIONS OF LIBERTY AND EQUALITY: AN
"ALIEN'S" VIEW OF TIERED SCRUTINY, AD HOC
BALANCING, GOVERNMENTAL POWER, AND
JUDICIAL IMPERIALISM
Michael A. Scaperlanda'
Doctrinal messiness marked the end of the Supreme Court's 2002
term. In Grutter v. Bollinger,' the Court was strictly deferential,
reaffirming the use of strict scrutiny of all race-based classifications while
deferring to the University of Michigan Law School's judgment that
diversity was a compelling reason to use racial criteria in its admissions
policy.2 And in Lawrence v. Texas,3 the Court applied rational basis
review in an uncharacteristically nondeferential way to strike down
Texas's sodomy restrictions on substantive due process grounds,
concluding that "[t]he Texas statute furthers no legitimate state interest
which can justify its intrusion into the personal and private life of the
individual."
4
' Gene and Elaine Edwards Family Chair in Law and Associate Dean for Research,
University of Oklahoma College of Law. I would like to thank Matthew Sharp for his
excellent research assistance.
1. 539 U.S. 306 (2003).
2. Compare id. at 326 ("We have held that all racial classifications imposed by
government 'must be analyzed by a reviewing court under strict scrutiny.' This means that
such classifications are constitutional only if they are narrowly tailored to further
compelling governmental interests. 'Absent searching judicial inquiry into the justification
for such race-based measures,' we have no way to determine what 'classifications are
"benign" or "remedial" and what classifications are in fact motivated by illegitimate
notions of racial inferiority or simple racial politics.' We apply strict scrutiny to all racial
classifications to "'smoke out" illegitimate uses of race by assuring that [government] is
pursuing a goal important enough to warrant use of a highly suspect tool."' (alteration in
original) (citations omitted)), with id. at 328 ("The Law School's educational judgment
that such diversity is essential to its educational mission is one to which we defer .... Our
holding today is in keeping with our tradition of giving a degree of deference to a
university's academic decisions. ... ), and id. at 329 ("'[G]ood faith' on the part of a
university is 'presumed' absent 'a showing to the contrary."' (quoting Regents of Univ. of
Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 318-19 (1978)).
3. 539 U.S. 558 (2003).
4. Id. at 578.
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Grutter and Lawrence are but the latest in a series of cases trending
away from several decades of categorical balancing' and toward a new
regime of ad hoc or sliding scale balancing6 in the Supreme Court's equal
protection and substantive due process jurisprudence 7 These cases
follow Plyler v. Doe,8 City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, Inc.,
5. Categorical balancing (assigning a particular level of judicial scrutiny, i.e., rational
basis, intermediate scrutiny, or strict scrutiny, to a case) involves a judicial
predetermination of the relative weight to be given to the contending individual and
governmental interests.
6. Ad hoc balancing is a more freewheeling case-by-case weighing of the contending
interests. In the First Amendment context, it has been said that "[a]n ad hoc approach
weighs, in each particular case, the interests served by the speech against the asserted state
interest in prohibition or regulation." Pierre J. Schlag, An Attack on Categorical
Approaches to Freedom of Speech, 30 UCLA L. REV. 671, 673 (1983). In contrast, "a rule
emerges from definitional balancing which can be employed in future cases without the
occasion for further weighing of interests." Melville B. Nimmer, The Right To Speak from
Times to Time: First Amendment Theory Applied to Libel and Misapplied to Privacy, 56
CAL. L. REV. 935, 944-45 (1968). "That is, the Court employs balancing not for the
purpose of determining which litigant deserves to prevail in the particular case, but only
for the purpose of defining which forms of speech are to be regarded as 'speech' within the
meaning of the first amendment." Id. at 942. "A categorical approach resembles a
definitional balancing approach. Those approaches have been distinguished on the basis
that definitional balancing expressly involves balancing of interests but categorical
approaches do not." F. Jay Dougherty, All the World's Not a Stooge: The
"Transformativeness" Test for Analyzing a First Amendment Defense to a Right of
Publicity Claim Against Distribution of a Work of Art, 27 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 1, 41-42
(2003) (internal quotations omitted); see also Kathleen M. Sullivan, Post-Liberal Judging:
The Roles of Categorization and Balancing, 63 U. COLO. L. REV. 293, 293-94 (1992)
("Categorization is the taxonomist's style-a job of classification and labeling. When
categorical formulas operate, all the important work in litigation is done at the outset.
Once the relevant right and mode of infringement have been described, the outcome
follows, without any explicit judicial balancing .... Balancing is more like grocer's work
(or Justice's)-the judge's job is to place competing rights and interests on a scale and
weigh them against each other. Here the outcome is not determined at the outset, but
depends on the relative strength of a multitude of factors.").
7. Speaking of constitutional interpretation more broadly, Professor Aleinikoff
concluded eighteen years ago that "balancing... has become widespread, if not dominant,
over the last four decades." T. Alexander Aleinikoff, Constitutional Law in the Age of
Balancing, 96 YALE L.J. 943, 943-44 (1987); see also Sullivan, supra note 6, at 296 ("Even
if Aleinikoff overstated his case, he is certainly right that balancing has long been in
ascendancy."). Although Aleinikoff doesn't view the Lochner era as an age of balancing,
Aleinikoff, supra, at 951, I would suggest that it, with its Brandeis briefs, was a classic
period of balancing. See, e.g., Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905); see also Paul N.
Cox, An Interpretation and (Partial) Defense of Legal Formalism, 36 IND. L. REV. 57, 95
(2003) ("Lochner ... is an example of the use of a balancing test."); Jed Rubenfeld, The
Anti-Antidiscrimination Agenda, 111 YALE L.J. 1141, 1158 (2002) (explaining that in
Lochner, the Court "engage[d] in the very same kind of interest-balancing, scrutinizing the
needfulness of the law at issue").
8. 457 U.S. 202 (1982).
9. 473 U.S. 432 (1985).
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Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey,'° and Romer
v. Evans." Is this shift in constitutional doctrine a vindication of Justice
Thurgood Marshall? He disagreed "with the Court's rigidified approach
to equal protection analysis.",12 Instead, he favored a more flexible,
sliding scale approach:
A principled reading of what this Court has done reveals that it
has applied a spectrum of standards in reviewing discrimination
allegedly violative of the Equal Protection Clause. This
spectrum clearly comprehends variations in the degree of care
with which the Court will scrutinize particular classifications,
depending, I believe, on the constitutional and societal
importance of the interest adversely affected and the recognized
invidiousness of the basis upon which the particular
classification is drawn.13
My answer is no, Marshall has not been vindicated, at least not fully.
An examination of the Court's record in equal protection and due
process cases reveals that the Court's rhetoric of protecting discrete and
insular minorities from a tyrannical majority14 and protecting the
fundamental liberty interests of individuals 5 from that same unruly
10. 505 U.S. 833 (1992).
11. 517 U.S. 620 (1996).
12. San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 98 (1973) (Marshall, J.,
dissenting).
13. Id. at 98-99; see also Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. at 460 (Marshall, J.,
concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part); Doe, 457 U.S. at 231 (Marshall,
J., concurring): cf David L. Faigman, Reconciling Individual Rights and Government
Interests: Madisonian Principles Versus Supreme Court Practice, 78 VA. L. REV. 1521, 1528
(1992) ("Once a challenger is successful in establishing the existence of a constitutional
right ... the Court intercedes to review the majority's actions under a level of scrutiny that
varies with the perceived importance of the right.").
14. See, e.g., Doe, 457 U.S. at 213 ("[E]ach aspect of the Fourteenth Amendment
reflects an elementary limitation on state power. . . . The Equal Protection Clause was
intended to work nothing less than the abolition of all caste-based and invidious class-
based legislation."); see also Andrew A. Beerworth, Lead Article, Religion in the
Marketplace: Establishments, Pluralisms, and the Doctrinal Eclipse of Free Exercise, 26 T.
JEFFERSON L. REV. 333, 375 (2004) ("The essential function of equal protection is to
prevent the democratic majority from inflicting injuries or imposing burdens on racial
minorities without inflicting the same injuries or imposing the same burdens on itself.").
15. See, e.g., Witney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 373 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring)
("[I]t is settled that the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment applies to
matters of substantive law as well as to matters of procedure. Thus all fundamental rights
comprised within the term liberty are protected by the Federal Constitution from invasion
by the States."), overruled by Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969). In a formula that
seems a bit dated post-Lawrence, the Court said "the Due Process Clause specially
protects those fundamental rights and liberties which are, objectively, 'deeply rooted in
this Nation's history and tradition,' and 'implicit in the concept of ordered liberty,' such
2005]
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majority is but an illusion, masking a reality that gives primacy of
consideration to governmental interests above those of the individual,
locating ultimate power and authority in the "non-political" branch of
the federal government. The implicit starting point of the Court's
analysis in equal protection and substantive due process is neither "the
constitutional and societal importance of the interest adversely affected"
nor the "invidiousness of the... particular classification. 1 6 Marshall had
it backwards. What drives the analysis initially is the Court's perception
of the political branches' need for flexibility in governing in a particular
situation. Where the Court perceives that the government needs little or
no flexibility, then it is free to consider more readily the importance of
the liberty interest or the invidiousness of the classification." But, when
the Court thinks that the governing authority must be free to decide
among a broad range of options, the interests and classifications suddenly
become less important in the Court's analysis.8
The alienage cases provide a particularly powerful lens through which
to examine this counterintuitive phenomenon because in this area the
Court explicitly decreases the level of scrutiny as the state and federal
governments' interests increase.' 9 These cases will be the focus of Part I.
From there, we can branch out to other areas, and I will argue that the
same phenomenon is at play throughout the Court's equal protection and
substantive due process jurisprudence, albeit more subtly. Parts II and
III of the Article will explore the rise and now decline of categorical
balancing in equal protection and substantive due process. The Court's
shift from categorical to ad hoc balancing can be explained by its desire
to increase its own flexibility and power. Categorical balancing, while
that 'neither liberty nor justice would exist if they were sacrificed."' Washington v.
Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 720-21 (1997) (citations omitted).
16. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. at 99 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
17. See Faigman, supra note 13, at 1523, 1580. Faigman explains:
The search for the meaning of the constitutional text often includes a review of
the government interests at stake. Because the threshold question regarding the
existence of constitutional rights has become infected with the government's
countervailing interests, those individual rights have lost much of their vitality, if
not their very existence.
Id. at 1523. "[lJn multitiered balancing contexts[, for example,] the Court employs
government interests to dilute the definition of rights, rather than scrutinize those interests
to determine whether they justify the infringement of defined rights." Id. at 1580.
18. See Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 223-24 (1944). Korenatsu, the
infamous case ushering in strict scrutiny and the two-tiered system of categorical
balancing, betrayed this reality. In Korematsu, the Court held that racial classifications
should be subject to strict judicial scrutiny but then turned a blind eye on the interned
Japanese-Americans, deferring to the military's judgment that interment was required to
safeguard national security. Id. at 216, 223-24.
19. See infra note 23 and accompanying text.
[Vol. 55:5
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minimizing the perception that the Court was illegitimately engaged in
Lochner-like judicial legislation,20 ended up boxing the Court into a
corner with its use of rigid categories. To counter the rigidity of the
tiered system, the Court first attempted to develop another (middle) tier
of scrutiny,2 but ended up (or so it would appear) abandoning, if not
formally then functionally, the categorical system altogether. With the
increasing use of ad hoc balancing, the Court has created more space for
itself, making it the ultimate beneficiary of a gradual power shift.
To reiterate, my first thesis is that the Court implicitly gives primacy of
consideration to the governments' interest in equal protection and
substantive due process cases despite its rhetoric to the contrary. My
second thesis is that the move from categorical to ad hoc balancing
unmasks a desire by the Court to locate maximum governmental power
within the judiciary as the Court gives itself more flexibility to mediate
between the political branches' claims of the need for flexibility in
governing and the individual's claim to be free from discriminatory or
oppressive legislation. If, as I suggest, the Court sides with the political
branches of government when it perceives the need for governmental
flexibility, it is important to dig beneath the surface and to expose the
Court's implicit anthropological assumptions that govern its view of the
role of law and lawmaking in shaping the lives of individuals living in our
community. The Article's concluding section draws some tentative
conclusions, suggesting that the current Court has been well schooled in
liberal egalitarian philosophy and is in the process of developing a system
of ad hoc balancing to maximize its ability to shape our national identity
around that philosophy.22
20. See, e.g., David D. Meyer, Lochner Redeemed: Family Privacy After Troxel and
Carhart, 48 UCLA L. REV. 1125, 1127 (2001) ("[T]he Court has sought to replace the
meandering value judgments of the Lochner era with the fixed directives of modern
fundamental rights analysis."); Sullivan, supra note 6, at 296 ("In equal protection and
substantive due process law, for example, the two-tiered system was meant to enshrine
penitence for the sins of the Lochner era.").
21. See Sullivan, supra note 6, at 297-99.
22. In contrast, the Lochner Court seemed schooled in laissez-faire economics and
social Darwinism. See, e.g., John 0. McGinnis, Reviving Tocqueville's America: The
Rehnquist Court's Jurisprudence of Social Discovery, 90 CAL. L. REV. 485, 499 (2002)
("[n the Lochner era the reigning laissez-faire theories of the day and even Herbert
Spencer's Social Statics influenced the Court."); James G. Wilson, The Morality of
Formalism, 33 UCLA L. REV. 431, 460 (1985) (explaining that in Lochner, "the Court
claimed only to be applying neutral, objective law while actually imposing laissez-faire
economics upon society"). But see, e.g., David E. Bernstein, Lochner Era Revisionism,
Revised: Lochner and the Origins of Fundamental Rights Constitutionalism, 92 GEO. L.J. 1,
12-13 (2003) ("[T]he basic motivation for Lochnerian jurisprudence was the Justices'
belief that Americans had fundamental unenumerated constitutional rights, and that the
Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause protected those rights. . . .[T]herefore,
Lochner was the progenitor of modern substantive due process cases such as Griswold v.
2005]
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I. VINDICATION OF MARSHALL?: A LOOK AT THE ALIEN CASES
The Supreme Court's alienage jurisprudence runs the spectrum of
standards from strict scrutiny to flirtation with the political question
doctrine and a near renunciation of any judicial role in reviewing
governmental action affecting noncitizens.2 3 In those heady days of the
late 1960s and early 1970s, when the Court was expanding both242
procedural 24 and substantive rights, 5 as well as promoting various notions
of equality,2 6 it addressed, on equal protection grounds, the question of
whether a state could discriminate against lawful resident aliens in the
distribution of welfare benefits 7  In holding that such discrimination
violates the Equal Protection Clause, the Court categorized aliens as "a
prime example of a 'discrete and insular' minority for whom . . .
Connecticut, Roe v. Wade, and Lawrence v. Texas ..... (footnotes omitted)); Barry
Cushman, The Secret Lives of the Four Horsemen, 83 VA. L. REV. 559, 560-61 (1997)
("The Four Horsemen were themselves closet liberals. It appears that they struck a
reactionary pose in celebrated cases in order to retain the good graces of the conservative
sponsors to whom they owed their positions and whose social amenities they continued to
enjoy, while in legions of low-profile cases they quietly struck blows for their own left-
liberal agendas.").
23. See Michael Scaperlanda, Partial Membership: Aliens and the Constitutional
Community, 81 IOWA L. REV. 707, 752 (1996) ("The alienage cases are unique because
they exhibit the full range of doctrinal options currently used by the judiciary."); Michael
A. Scaperlanda, The Paradox of a Title: Discrimination Within the Anti-Discrimination
Provisions of the Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986, 1988 WIS. L. REV. 1043,
1054-80 [hereinafter Scaperlanda, Paradox of a Title] (exploring the development and
range of standards of review in alienage cases).
24. See, e.g., Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 264 (1970) ("[W]hen welfare is
discontinued, only a pre-termination evidentiary hearing provides the recipient with
procedural due process."). See generally Randy Lee, Twenty-Five Years After Goldberg v.
Kelly: Traveling From the Right Spot on the Wrong Road to the Wrong Place, 23 CAP. U. L.
REV. 863 (1994).
25. See, e.g., Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 154 (1973) (right to an abortion); Griswold v.
Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 485-86 (1965) (right of marital privacy regarding contraceptive
use).
26. See, e.g., Parham v. Hughes, 441 U.S. 347, 353 (1979) (plurality opinion)
(heightened scrutiny to protect illegitimate children); Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S.
677, 688 (1973) (plurality opinion) (heightened scrutiny to protect women); Eisenstadt v.
Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 454 (1972) (right of individual, regardless of marital status, to
contraception); Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 629-31 (1969) (right to travel),
overruled in part by Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651 (1974).
27. Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 366 (1971) ("These are welfare cases. They
provide yet another aspect of the widening litigation in this area. The issue here is
whether the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment prevents a State from
conditioning welfare benefits either (a) upon the beneficiary's possession of United States
citizenship, or (b) if the beneficiary is an alien, upon his having resided in this country for
a specified number of years." (footnote omitted)).
[Vol. 55:5
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heightened judicial solicitude is appropriate., 28 It said that "the Court's
decisions have established that classifications based on alienage, like
those based on nationality or race, are . . . subject to close judicial
scrutiny.29
Taking the Court's reasoning at face value0 and given the reasons it
employs strict scrutiny in cases where a government discriminates against
a discrete and insular minority,3 one might expect the Court to employ
strict scrutiny in all cases of alienage classifications to ensure that the
discrimination against the targeted vulnerable population was not
invidious. And, in one type of alienage case it has done so. Following
28. Id. at 372 (citation omitted) (citing United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S.
144, 152 n.4 (1938)). Characterizing aliens as a discrete and insular minority in need of
special judicial protection from potentially invidious legislation has generated controversy.
Several have argued that alienage is not an immutable trait. See, e.g., Volker Knoppke-
Wetzel, Employment Restrictions and the Practice of Law by Aliens in the United States
and Abroad, 1974 DUKE L.J. 871, 899 n.166; Matthew Poppe, Comment, Defining the
Scope of the Equal Protection Clause with Respect to Welfare Waiting Periods, 61 U. CHI.
L. REV. 291, 314 (1994). Others have suggested that even without the franchise, aliens are
often not politically powerless because surrogates take up their interests. See, e.g.,
Mitchell Kurfis, Note, The Constitutionality of California's Proposition 187: An Equal
Protection Analysis, 32 CAL. W. L. REV. 129, 153 (1995). Still others have noted the wide
disparity in the treatment of aliens, which is often dependent on national origin, ethnicity,
and reasons for migrating. See, e.g., Thomas W. Simon, Suspect Class Democracy: A
Social Theory, 45 U. MIAMI L. REV. 107, 135 (1990).
29. Graham, 403 U.S. at 371-72 (footnotes omitted). "The classifications involved in
the instant cases . . . are inherently suspect and are therefore subject to strict judicial
scrutiny whether or not a fundamental right [,the right to travel,] is impaired." Id. at 376.
30. See id. at 376-77 ("An additional reason why the state statutes at issue in these
cases do not withstand constitutional scrutiny emerges from the area of federal-state
relations.").
31. See infra text accompanying notes 98-99.
32. This was the principle at work in the affirmative action case of Adarand
Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200 (1995). In Adarand Constructors, the Court said
that its cases
had established three general propositions with respect to governmental racial
classifications. First, skepticism: "'Any preference based on racial or ethnic
criteria must necessarily receive a most searching examination."' Second,
consistency: "[Tihe standard of review under the Equal Protection Clause is not
dependent on the race of those burdened or benefited by a particular
classification," .... And third, congruence: "Equal protection analysis in the
Fifth Amendment area is the same as that under the Fourteenth Amendment."
Taken together, these three propositions lead to the conclusion that any person,
of whatever race, has the right to demand that any governmental actor subject to
the Constitution justify any racial classification subjecting that person to unequal
treatment under the strictest judicial scrutiny.
Id. at 223-24 (holding unclear) (first alteration in original) (citations omitted). In the
immigration context,
[w]hatever the rationales which support suspect class status in the context of
state discrimination, those rationales must support it as well with respect to
2005]
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Graham v. Richardson,33 for example, the Court invalidated New York's
civil service law, which limited eligibility in the state's civil service to
citizens.34  In striking down this law, the Court recognized the "State's
interest in establishing its own form of government, and in limiting
participation in that government to those who are within 'the basic
conception of a political community."' 3  Employing strict scrutiny, the
Court rejected New York's proffered justification because the civil
service statute was not narrowly drawn so as to create a close nexus
between the means chosen and the state's important and desired end of
generating a defined political community. "The citizenship restriction
sweeps indiscriminately," bringing within its discriminatory fold "the
sanitation man .... the typist .... the office worker, as well as ... the
person who directly participates in the formulation and execution of
important state policy. 3 6  In short, the statute seemed designed to
protect and enhance the economic prospects of the dominant group at
the expense of a vulnerable population. The use of strict scrutiny
allowed the Court to unmask this invidious goal.
Given its desire to ensure that the state's reasons for discriminating
against aliens are compelling and that "the means [employed by the
state] be precisely drawn in light of the acknowledged purpose,"37 we
could have expected the Court to employ strict scrutiny when it reviewed
a California statute that prohibited noncitizens from obtaining
federal discrimination: "Aliens stand in the same position with respect to the
federal government as they do with respect to the states. The same problem of
stigma is involved. They are as effectively excluded from the political process at
the national level. Indeed, given their greater vulnerability to hostile federal
action, especially deportation, they are even less likely to adopt an overly
political role. And aliens have suffered as long a history of purposeful unequal
treatment at the hands of the federal government as they have at the hands of
the states."
Linda S. Bosniak, Membership, Equality, and the Difference That Alienage Makes, 69
N.Y.U. L. REV. 1047, 1105 n.250 (1994) (quoting Gerald M. Rosberg, The Protection of
Aliens from Discriminatory Treatment by the National Government, 1977 SUP. CT. REV.
275, 314).
33. 403 U.S. 365 (1971).
34. See Sugarman v. Dougall, 413 U.S. 634, 646 (1973). Since Graham and Sugarman,
the Court has used strict scrutiny to strike down several state laws that discriminated
based on alienage. See, e.g., Bernal v. Fainter, 467 U.S. 216, 227-28 (1984) (state cannot
discriminate against aliens in licensing notaries); Nyquest v. Mauclet, 432 U.S. 1, 12 (1977)
(state cannot discriminate against aliens in providing financial aid for higher education);
Examining Bd. of Eng'rs, Architects, & Surveyors v. Flores de Otero, 426 U.S. 572, 606
(1976) (state cannot prevent aliens from being licensed as civil engineers); In re Griffiths,
413 U.S. 717, 718, 729 (1973) (state cannot prohibit aliens from becoming lawyers).
35. Sugarman, 413 U.S. at 642 (quoting Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330, 344 (1972)).
36. Id. at 643 (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted).
37. Id.
[Vol. 55:5
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employment as peace officers, to determine whether this law was under-
or overinclusive; whether it was mere rank economic protectionism,
which had been disallowed in Graham; and whether the state could show
that the law was necessary to achieve a compelling state interest. If the
Court had used strict scrutiny, California's statute limiting peace officer
positions to citizens would have been invalidated. Following dicta in
Sugarman v. Dougall,38 the Court in Cabell v. Chavez-Salido" concluded
that California had a strong interest in reserving probation officer
positions for citizens as part of the State's ongoing efforts "'in
establishing its own form of government.' 40 Assuming, arguendo, that
this state's interest was compelling, under strict scrutiny the statute
should still have been struck down because it was not narrowly tailored
to achieve the compelling end. The problematic nature of the state's case
should have been revealed here, in the examination of the nexus between
means and ends. At the time that plaintiffs were denied jobs as
probation officers, the statutory definition of peace officer included some
seventy positions, including "cemetery sextons, furniture and bedding
inspectors, livestock identification inspectors, and toll service
employees,, 4' as well as "individuals charged with enforcement of the
alcoholic beverage laws, the food and drug laws, fire laws, . . .park
rangers, [and] welfare-fraud or child-support investigators. 4 ' The
sweeping nature of the law suggests that
California's statutory exclusion of aliens is fatally overinclusive
and underinclusive. It bars aliens from employment in
numerous public positions where the State's proffered
justification has little, if any, relevance. At the same time, it
allows aliens to fill other positions that would seem naturally to
43
fall within the State's asserted purpose.
38. 413 U.S. 634 (1973).
39. 454 U.S. 432 (1982).
40. Id. at 438 (quoting Sugarman, 413 U.S. at 642).
41. Id. at 442, 450-51.
42. Id. at 443 (citation omitted).
43. Id. at 455 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). "Before 1961, California did not require any
of its peace officers to be citizens." Id. at 451.
In 1961, without stating any rationale, "in one fell swoop, the legislature .
applied the mandatory citizenship requirement to all the [peace officer] positions
The legislature apparently made no attempt to include on the "peace
officer" list all positions for which citizenship arguably might be relevant or to
exclude all positions for which it plainly would be irrelevant.
Id. at 452 (citation omitted). This statute was "an unthinking and haphazard exercise of
state power" that was both under- and overinclusive according to the dissent. Id. at 454.
It was overinclusive because many of the "70 'peace officer' positions . .. 'cannot be
considered members of the political community no matter how liberally that category is
viewed."' Id. (quoting Chavez-Salido v. Cabell, 490 F. Supp. 984, 987 (C.D. Cal. 1980)). It
2005]
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Instead of applying strict scrutiny and striking down the law, the Court
created a new, more deferential standard," "conclud[ing] that strict
scrutiny is out of place when the [citizenship] restriction primarily serves
a political function. 4 ' To determine which test to apply, the Court
examines the nature of the state government's purported interest 46 In
the Court's perception, citizens and permanent resident aliens are
functional equivalents when it comes to enjoying the state's economic
largesse and natural resources. 47 Therefore, the state needs no flexibility
in distinguishing between citizens and permanent resident aliens in
economic matters, and the Court can apply strict scrutiny to protect this
discrete and insular minority. "[Alithough citizenship is not a relevant
ground for the distribution of economic benefits, it is a relevant ground
for determining membership in the political community. Therefore,
"in those areas the State's exclusion of aliens need not 'clear the high
hurdle of "strict scrutiny," because [that] would "obliterate all the
distinctions between citizens and aliens, and thus depreciate the historic
value of citizenship.' ' 49  Instead of holding that the formation of a
was underinclusive because "California has long permitted aliens to teach in public
schools, to be employed on public works, and to serve in most state, city, and county
employment positions-all positions arguably within the political community." Id.
44. Id. at 440 (majority opinion). When
a particular restriction on legally resident aliens serves political and not
economic goals [it] is to be evaluated in a two-step process. First, the specificity
of the classification will be examined: a classification that is substantially
overinclusive or underinclusive tends to undercut the governmental claim that
the classification serves legitimate political ends. . . . Second, even if the
classification is sufficiently tailored, it may be applied in the particular case only
to "persons holding state elective or important nonelective executive, legislative,
and judicial positions," those officers who "participate directly in the
formulation, execution, or review of broad public policy" and hence "perform
functions that go to the heart of representative government."
Id. (citation omitted) (quoting Sugarman, 413 U.S. at 647).
45. Id. at 439 ("'[O]ur scrutiny will not be so demanding where we deal with matters
resting firmly within a State's constitutional prerogatives [and] constitutional
responsibility for the establishment and operation of its own government, as well as the
qualifications of an appropriately designated class of public office holders."' (alterations in
original) (quoting Sugarman, 413 U.S. at 648)).
46. See, e.g., id.
47. Id. at 437-38. For an examination of the now defunct "special public interest
doctrine," which had allowed states to discriminate against aliens in order to protect the
state's economic resources, see Scaperlanda, Paradox of a Title, supra note 23, at 1057-60.
48. Cabell, 454 U.S. at 438.
49. Id. at 439 (alteration in original) (quoting Foley v. Connelie, 435 U.S. 29t, 295
(1978) (citation omitted)). This is true only if Professor Gunther's dicta, see Gerald
Gunther, The Supreme Court, 1971 Term -Foreword: In Search of Evolving Doctrine on a
Changing Court: A Model for a Newer Equal Protection, 86 HARV. L. REV. 1, 8 (1972),
which was rejected by the Court in Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 326 (2003), is
accurate. That is, the Court's statement that applying strict scrutiny would "'obliterate the
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political community is a compelling interest and judging to ensure that
the means chosen are necessary to achieve that end, the Court changes
the game plan, lowering the standard.
When we move from state to federal discrimination on alienage
grounds, the Court's perception of the need for political branch flexibility
grows to the point of completely obliterating the rights of the individual
alien. In language eerily reminiscent of an infamous nineteenth century
membership case in which the Court said that blacks, ° "whether
emancipated or not,.... had no rights or privileges but such as those who
held the power and the Government might choose to grant them,"51 the
Court has said that "[w]hatever the procedure authorized by Congress is,
it is due process as far as an alien denied entry is concerned."52 Under
distinctions between citizens and aliens,"' Cabell, 454 U.S. at 439 (quoting Foley, 435 U.S.
at 295 (citation omitted)), would only be true if strict scrutiny truly was "'strict' in theory
and fatal in fact," Gunther, supra, at 8. This dilemma faced by the Court in Cabell
illustrates my thesis that the Court boxed itself in by its categorical approach. See infra
Parts II, III.
50. 1 use the word "black" here rather than "African-American" because a vital point
of the Dred Scott case was to reject the idea that blacks, even free blacks, were members
of the American (U.S.) political community. According to the Court, they were not
American. Scott v. Sandford (Dred Scott), 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393, 454 (1857), superseded
by U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
51. Id. at 405. Some contemporary scholars continue to follow Dred Scott,
maintaining the view that membership in a political community means everything and that
non-members are owed no respect or dignity save that given by the grace of political
community. See, e.g., BRUCE A. ACKERMAN, SOCIAL JUSTICE IN THE LIBERAL STATE 74
(1980) ("Citizenship... is a concept in political-not biological-theory."). "[AIII people
who fulfill the dialogic and behavioral conditions have an unconditional right to demand
recognition as full citizens of a liberal state." Id. at 88 (emphasis omitted). But "the fate
of noncitizens will be an appropriate subject for majoritarian politics." Id. at 71. This
troubling view rejects The Declaration of Independence's proposition that all human
beings have certain inalienable rights. THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 2
(U.S. 1776) ("We hold these truths to be self-evident: that all men are created equal; that
they are endowed, by their Creator, with certain unalienable rights; that among these are
life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness."); see also Abraham Lincoln, Speech on the
Dred Scott Decision at Springfield, Illinois (June 26, 1857), in ABRAHAM LINCOLN:
SPEECHES AND WRITINGS: 1832-1858, at 390, 398 (Don E. Fehrenbacher ed., 1989) ("[The
Founders] defined with tolerable distinctness, in what respects they did consider all men
created equal-equal in 'certain inalienable rights, among which are life, liberty and the
pursuit of happiness.' . . . They meant to set up a standard maxim for free society."); Pope
John Paul II, Post-Synodal Apostolic Exhortation: Ecclesia in America pt. 57 (Jan. 22,
1999), http://www.vatican.va/holy-father/john-paul-ii/apost-exhortations/documents/hf-jp
-ii exh_22011999_ecclesia-in-americaen.html. ("This dignity is common to all, without
exception, since all have been created in the image of God.").
52. United States ex rel. Knauff v. Shaughnessy, 338 U.S. 537, 544 (1950) (upholding
the denial of entry without a hearing for the alien wife of an American soldier on national
security related grounds). No hearing was granted on the ground that the hearing itself
would compromise national security. Id. For more on Knauff's plight, see ELLEN
RAPHAEL KNAUFF, THE ELLEN KNAUFF STORY (1952); Charles D. Weisselberg, The
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this reasoning even an alien who had lived a "life of unrelieved
insignificance 5 1 for more than a quarter of a century in Buffalo, New
York, could be detained indefinitely on Ellis Island without a hearing
upon attempting to reenter the country.54
Perceiving no need for federal governmental flexibility to treat
noncitizens differently from citizens in the criminal justice system, the
Court has held that aliens are entitled to the same constitutional rights as
citizens before criminal punishment can be imposed.5  But, outside of the
criminal procedure arena, the Court has placed its imprimatur upon a
wide range of congressional and executive decisions that violate domestic
constitutional norms and would be found unconstitutional but for the
Court's perception that the political branches of the federal government
need a great deal of flexibility in dealing with noncitizens.56 Rejecting
Graham and Sugarman's use of strict scrutiny, the Court in Mathews v.
Diaz upheld federal legislation that employed alienage discrimination to
deny some permanent resident aliens federal welfare benefits57 and
assumed that Congress and the president had the power to prohibit
aliens from receiving jobs in the federal civil service.58 The Court has
Exclusion and Detention of Aliens: Lessons from the Lives of Ellen Knauff and Ignatz
Mezei, 143 U. PA. L. REV. 933,955-64 (1995).
53. Shaughnessy v. United States ex rel. Mezei, 345 U.S. 206, 219 (1953) (Jackson, J.,
dissenting).
54. See id. at 214-15 (majority opinion); see also Weisselberg, supra note 52, at 955-57.
55. See Wong Wing v. United States, 163 U.S. 228, 238 (1896). The Court has held,
however, that an alien sitting in a United States prison is not entitled to the Fourth
Amendment's exclusionary rule protection for a search conducted in Mexico. See United
States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259, 273-75 (1990); Gerald L. Neuman, Whose
Constitution?, 100 YALE L.J. 909, 912 (1991); Michael Scaperlanda, The Domestic Fourth
Amendment Rights of Aliens: To What Extent Do They Survive United States v. Verdugo-
Urquirdez?, 56 Mo. L. REV. 213,224 (1991).
56. See Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U.S. 698, 713 (1893) ("The power to
exclude or to expel aliens, being a power affecting international relations, is vested in the
political departments of the government."); Hiroshi Motomura, Immigration Law After a
Century of Plenary Power: Phantom Constitutional Norms and Statutory Interpretation, 100
YALE L.J. 545, 563 (1990) ("Institutional constraints, especially the judiciary's sensitivity
to its limited factfinding capability and attenuated electoral responsibility, make courts
reluctant to issue a constitutional command to the political branches of government.").
57. See Mathews v. Diaz. 426 U.S. 67, 83-85 (1976); see also Soskin v. Reinertson, 353
F.3d 1242, 1256-57 (10th Cir. 2004) (holding that a state does not violate the Constitution
when it cuts some legal aliens from welfare roles when it has the federal government's
permission).
58. Hampton v. Mow Sun Wong, 426 U.S. 88, 103 (1976). In Hampton, the Court
invalidated the Civil Service Commission rule that restricted employment in the federal
civil service to citizens on the ground that the commission "has no responsibility for
foreign affairs, for treaty negotiations, for establishing immigration quotas or conditions of
entry, or for naturalization policies." Id. at 114. Following the Hampton decision,
President Ford, through an executive order, reinstituted the ban on alien employment in
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also deferred to the political branches, sanctioning the discriminatory
exclusion and/or deportation of aliens on the basis of race, 9 speech, 60 and
gender.6' One could contend that in cases such as these the Court ought
to employ strict scrutiny to ensure that the federal government is not
engaged in invidious discrimination against this discrete and insular
minority, and that its lines are narrowly drawn to serve compelling state
interests. When the federal government excludes or deports an alien on
grounds of race, speech, or gender, the First and Fifth Amendments
supply additional grounds for heightened judicial review of such action.62
the competitive civil service, and this order was upheld by lower courts. See Vergara v.
Hampton, 581 F.2d 1281, 1286-87 (7th Cir. 1978); Santin Ramos v. U.S. Civil Serv.
Comm'n., 430 F. Supp. 422, 424-25 (D.P.R. 1977); Mow Sun Wong v. Hampton, 435 F.
Supp. 37, 44-46 (N.D. Cal. 1977), affd sub nom. Mow Sun Wong v. Campbell, 626 F.2d 739
(9th Cir. 1980).
59. E.g., The Chinese Exclusion Case, 130 U.S. 581, 606 (1889) ("If . . . the
government of the United States, through its legislative department, considers the
presence of foreigners of a different race in this country, who will not assimilate with us, to
be dangerous to its peace and security, their exclusion is not to be stayed ...."); Fong Yue
Ting, 149 U.S. at 730-32 (upholding the expulsion of Chinese citizens). The Chinese
Exclusion Case is still cited as authoritative precedent today. See, e.g., Soskin, 353 F.3d at
1255; Detroit Free Press v. Ashcroft, 303 F.3d 681, 685-86 (6th Cir. 2002); Hall v. INS, 253
F. Supp. 2d 244, 248 (D.R.I. 2003). These cases and race-based immigration policies have
come under heavy criticism. See, e.g., Gabriel J. Chin, Is There a Plenary Power Doctrine?
A Tentative Apology and Prediction for Our Strange but Unexceptional Constitutional
Immigration Law, 14 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 257, 260-64 (2000); Kevin R. Johnson, The
Antiterrorism Act, The Immigration Reform Act, and Ideological Regulation in the
Immigration Laws: Important Lessons for Citizens and Noncitizens, 28 ST. MARY'S L.J.
833. 843 (1997); Victor C. Romero, On Elidn and Aliens: A Political Solution to the
Plenary Power Problem, 4 N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & PUB. POL'Y 343,347-51 (2001).
60. E.g., Kleindienst v. Mandel, 408 U.S. 753, 765-70 (1972) (upholding exclusion
based on political opinion); Galvan v. Press, 347 U.S. 522, 528-32 (1954) (upholding
deportation because of prior membership in Communist Party); Harisiades v.
Shaughnessy, 342 U.S. 580, 591-92 (1952) (same); see also Johnson, supra note 59, at 841-
69; Natsu Taylor Saito, Will Force Trump Legality After September 11? American
Jurisprudence Confronts the Rule of Law, 17 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 1. 39-41 (2002).
61. E.g., Tuan Anh Nguyen v. INS, 533 U.S. 53, 68-73 (2001) (upholding a citizenship
statute that treats the father-child relationship less favorably than the mother-child
relationship); Fiallo v. Bell, 430 U.S. 787, 797-800 (1977) (upholding a law that treated the
relationship between a natural mother and her offspring more favorably than the
relationship between a natural father and his offspring for immigration purposes). See
generally Cornelia T. L. Pillard & T. Alexander Aleinikoff, Skeptical Scrutiny of Plenary
Power: Judicial and Executive Branch Decision Making in Miller v. Albright, 1998 SUP.
CT. REV. 1; Erin Chlopak, Comment, Mandatory Motherhood and Frustrated Fatherhood:
The Supreme Court's Preservation of Gender Discrimination in American Citizenship Law,
51 AM. U. L. REV. 967 (2002).
62. See United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938)
("[W]hether prejudice against discrete and insular minorities may be a special condition,
which tends seriously to curtail the operation of those political processes ordinarily to be
relied upon to protect minorities, and which may call for a correspondingly more searching
judicial inquiry."). Justice Marshall, in his Fiallo dissent, said: "The class of citizens denied
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Despite multiple reasons for applying heightened scrutiny, the Court
chooses to defer to the federal government's political branches in these
cases.
So, why the shift in standard? Are aliens less likely to suffer invidious
discrimination at the hands of the federal government? Are our national
leaders more virtuous than our state leaders, and, therefore, in less need
of scrutiny from the judiciary? Or, is something else at play? As with
the political function exception to strict scrutiny in the state alienage
cases, the Court is very clear that the level of scrutiny depends not upon
the type of classification but on the nature of the governmental action
and the perceived need for governmental flexibility:
[T]he responsibility for regulating the relationship between the
United States and our alien visitors has been committed to the
political branches of the Federal Government. Since decisions
in these matters may implicate our relations with foreign
powers, and since a wide variety of classifications must be
defined in light of changing political and economic
circumstances, such decisions are frequently of a character more
appropriate to either the Legislature or the Executive than to
63the Judiciary.
Recognizing that Graham "provide[d] the strongest support for [the
aliens'] position,"64 the Court found Graham's use of strict scrutiny
inapplicable in a case involving federal discrimination against aliens.
Graham
involve[d] significantly different considerations because it
concern[ed] the relationship between aliens and the States
rather than between aliens and the Federal Government.
Insofar as state welfare policy is concerned, there is little, if
any, basis for treating persons who are citizens of another State
differently from persons who are citizens of another country.
Both groups are noncitizens as far as the State's interests in
administering its welfare programs are concerned.
[W]hereas, a comparable classification by the Federal
the special privilege of reunification in this country is defined on the basis of two
traditionally disfavored classifications-gender and legitimacy. Fathers cannot obtain
preferred status for their illegitimate children; mothers can." Fiallo, 430 U.S. at 809
(Marshall, J., dissenting). For a look at Justice Marshall's alienage jurisprudence, see
Michael Scaperlanda, Justice Thurgood Marshall and the Legacy of Dissent in Federal
Alienage Cases, 47 OKLA. L. REV. 55 (1994).
63. Mathews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67, 81 (1976) (footnote omitted). "This Court has
repeatedly emphasized that 'over no conceivable subject is the legislative power of
Congress more complete than it is over' the admission of aliens." Fiallo, 430 U.S. at 792
(quoting Oceanic Navigation Co. v. Stranahan, 214 U.S. 320, 339 (1909)).
64. Mathews, 426 U.S. at 84.
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Government is a routine and normally legitimate part of its
business.65
Mathews v. Diaz "illustrates the need for flexibility in policy choices
rather than the rigidity often characteristic of constitutional
adjudication. 66  Explicitly recognizing that the standard of review
changes with the government's interest, the Court continued:
Any rule of constitutional law that would inhibit the flexibility
of the political branches of government to respond to changing
world conditions should be adopted only with the greatest
caution. The reasons that preclude judicial review of political
questions also dictate a narrow standard of review of decisions
made by the Congress or the President in the area of
61immigration and naturalization.
It may seem obvious to the informed observer that the political
branches of the federal government need more flexibility when
interfacing with noncitizens than do the state governments, 6 but what is
interesting for the purposes of this Article, is how the Court formulates
doctrine to bring this distinction to life given Graham's classification of
aliens as a discrete and insular minority. Strict scrutiny, with the aura of
"'strict' in theory and fatal in fact,, 69 proved too rigid to accommodate
the federal government's recognized interest in regulating the admission,
65. Id. at 84-85 (footnote omitted). "[I]t is not 'political hypocrisy' to recognize that
the Fourteenth Amendment's limits on state powers are substantially different from the
constitutional provisions applicable to the federal power over immigration and
naturalization." Id. at 86-87. But see Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200,
223-24 (1995) ("Despite lingering uncertainty in the details, however, the Court's cases
through Croson had established three general propositions with respect to governmental
racial classifications. . . . [T]hird, congruence: 'Equal protection analysis in the Fifth
Amendment area is the same as that under the Fourteenth Amendment."' (citations
omitted) (quoting Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 93 (1976))).
66. Mathews, 426 U.S. at 81.
67. Id. at 81-82 (footnotes omitted).
"[A]ny policy toward aliens is vitally and intricately interwoven with
contemporaneous policies in regard to the conduct of foreign relations, the war
power, and the maintenance of a republican form of government. Such matters
are so exclusively entrusted to the political branches of government as to be
largely immune from judicial inquiry or interference."
Id. at 81 n.17 (alteration in original) (quoting Harisiades v. Shaughnessy, 342 U.S. 580,
588-89 (1952) (footnote omitted)).
68. Although it may seem obvious today that the federal government has almost
exclusive jurisdiction in alienage cases, no specific constitutional text gives it control over
immigration, and it did not legislate in the immigration area until 1875. See Gerald L.
Neuman, The Lost Century of American Immigration Law (1776-1875), 93 COLUM. L.
REV. 1833, 1835-40 (1993). Prior to that time, states regulated immigration. See id.
69. Gunther, supra note 49, at 8.
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exclusion, and deportation of noncitizens. In response, the Court
simply ignored its own characterization and applied a more deferential
standard, ignoring the possibility that the federal government was
behaving in an invidious manner toward a vulnerable and often
marginalized population. What the Court has done explicitly in the
alienage context, it has also done throughout equal protection and, to a
lesser extent, substantive due process jurisprudence." When the Court
perceives the need for governmental flexibility, it employs a more
deferential scrutiny, even if this entails sacrificing its own previously
stated criteria. In the next section, I explore this phenomenon.
1I. CATEGORICAL BALANCING: A RETROSPECTIVE
During the late 1930s and the early 1940s, a chastised Court held that
in an ordinary case, the Court would defer to the judgment of the
political arms of government, upholding laws that were rationally related
to a legitimate governmental interest.73 The burden was placed on the
one challenging the law to demonstrate that either the end was not
legitimate or the means chosen were not rational.74  Before life was
totally drained from Lochner v. New York75 and its progeny, however,
the Court hinted at the dawning of a new era of judicial creativity. While
most ordinary legislation and regulation would be met by the judiciary
with a presumption of constitutionality,76 the Court suggested that "more
searching judicial inquiry" would be appropriate in some cases, including
those involving "prejudice against discrete and insular minorities
[because such prejudice] tends seriously to curtail the operation of those
political processes ordinarily to be relied upon to protect minorities.""
70. See supra note 67 and accompanying text.
71. See Johnson, supra note 59, at 850-57; Weisselberg, supra note 52, at 954-64.
72. See infra notes 257-71 and accompanying text.
73. See, e.g., United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 154 (1938)
(upholding a law prohibiting the interstate transportation of skimmed milk disguised to
imitate milk or cream).
74. See, e.g., NLRB v. E. C. Atkins & Co., 331 U.S. 398, 414 (1947) ("In the absence
of some compelling evidence that the [National Labor Relations] Board has failed to
measure up to its responsibility, courts should be reluctant to overturn the considered
judgment of the Board and to substitute their own ideas of the public interest."),
superseded by statute, 29 U.S.C. § 159(b)(3) (2000).
75. 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
76. See, e.g., Carolene Prods., 304 U.S. at 152-53.
77. Id. at 153 n.4. Footnote four has sparked much scholarly commentary. See, e.g.,
JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST 75-77, 151-53 (1980); Bruce A.
Ackerman, Beyond Carolene Products, 98 HARV. L. REV. 713 (1985); J.M. Balkin, The
Footnote, 83 NW. U. L. REV. 275 (1989); Milner S. Ball, Judicial Protection of Powerless
Minorities, 59 IOWA L. REV. 1059, 1059-64 (1985); Lea Brilmayer, Carolene, Conflicts and
the Fate of the "Insider-Outsider," 134 U. PA. L. REV. 1291 (1986); Robert M. Cover, The
[Vol. 55:5
Illusions of Liberty and Equality
Additionally, the Court intimated a "narrower scope for operation of the
presumption of constitutionality when legislation appears on its face to
be within a specific prohibition of the Constitution, such as those of the
first ten amendments." ' In these cases, the burden would be on the
government to show that its legislative or regulatory end was compelling
and that the means it chose were necessary to achieve the compelling
end. 9
For one attempting to challenge or defend state action on equal
protection or substantive due process grounds, the critical question
becomes: into what category does my case fall-the ordinary one with its
corresponding deference to the political actors or those special categories
begging for more searching judicial review? In this two-later expanded
to three-tiered system, all interesting and relevant balancing of
individual and state interests is done by the Court in its decision to
categorize the case as one subject to rational basis, intermediate scrutiny,
or strict scrutiny review. Once the case is assigned a category, a nearly
mechanical application ensues, with the result virtually preordained.80
Origins of Judicial Activism in the Protection of Minorities, 91 YALE L. J. 1287, 1289-1309
(1982); Noel T. Dowling, The Methods of Mr. Justice Stone in Constitutional Cases, 41
COLUM. L. REV. 1160, 1176-77 (1941); Louis Lusky, Minority Rights and the Public
Interest, 52 YALE L.J. 1, 20-21 (1942).
78. Carolene Prods., 304 U.S. at 152 n.4.
79. See, e.g., Burson v. Freeman, 504 U.S. 191, 198 (1992) (plurality opinion)
(subjecting a "facially content-based restriction on political speech in a public forum" to
strict scrutiny review); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 155-56 (1973) (applying strict scrutiny
to laws infringing upon certain unenumerated rights); Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S.
365, 371-72 (1971) (applying strict scrutiny to classifications harming discrete and insular
minorities).
80. See Jeffrey M. Shaman, Essay: Constitutional Interpretation: Illusion and Reality,
41 WAYNE L. REV. 135. 138 (1994) ("Categories posit differences of kind, rather than
differences of degree, and they purport to make bright-line delineations."); Kathleen M.
Sullivan, The Supreme Court, 1991 Term -Foreword: The Justices of Rules and Standards,
106 HARV. L. REV. 22, 60 (1992) ("Thus, in true categorical fashion, two-tier review
generally decides cases through characterization at the outset, without the need for messy
explicit balancing. The classification [system] at the threshold cuts off further serious
debate: 'this is an x case and therefore the government (or rightholder) wins."'); see also
Richard A. Epstein, Of Same Sex Relationships and Affirmative Action: The Covert
Libertarianism of the United States Supreme Court, 12 SUPREME CT. ECON. REV. 75, 76
(2004) ("The most casual examination of [Grutter and Lawrence] reveals a certain level of
deep irony about them. For many years it has been assumed that setting the appropriate
level of review was a matter of constitutional destiny."); Calvin Massey, The New
Formalism: Requiem for Tiered Scrutiny?, 6 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 945, 945 (2004) ("Tiered
scrutiny was held together by the idea that courts could detect which legislative or
executive actions were presumptively void, and subject them to searching inquiry .... ).
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A. Equal Protection: Classification Based on Personal Characteristics
The Court's strict scrutiny jurisprudence in the equal protection arena
is built upon an understanding that, at its core, the Fourteenth
Amendment's Equal Protection Clause was meant to end state-
sanctioned discrimination against racial minorities."' Since there are no
relevant reasons to classify in such a way as to harm racial minorities and
no relevant reasons to classify in such a way as to benefit Caucasians, the
Court created a particularly stringent standard for reviewing• • 82
governmental classifications that harm racial minorities. In arriving at
this heightened standard of review, the Court considered several
centuries of racial injustice, the stigmatic harm associated with racial
discrimination, and the relative power imbalance between the majority
race and racial minorities.83 In short, it considered the invidiousness of
governmental classifications that harm racial minorities. But precisely
because it could think of no or almost no noninvidious reasons for using
racial criteria in such a way as to impose burdens on racial minorities, the
Court could afford to impose a high and rigid burden of justification on
the government. In other words, the strict scrutiny standard can be used
because the government requires no flexibility in maneuvering in this
arena as it develops and implements policy.
81. See, e.g., Bell v. Maryland, 378 U.S. 226, 290 (1964) (Goldberg, J., concurring)
("'[I]t is an inescapable inference that Congress, in recommending the Fourteenth
Amendment, expected to remove the disabilities barring Negroes'....); Strauder v. West
Virginia, 100 U.S. 303, 307 (1879) ("What is [the Fourteenth Amendment] but declaring
that the law in the States shall be the same for the black as for the white; that all persons,
whether colored or white, shall stand equal before the laws of the States, and, in regard to
the colored race, for whose protection the amendment was primarily designed, that no
discrimination shall be made against them by law because of their color?"); Slaughter-
House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36, 71 (1873) ("[A]nd on the most casual examination of
the language of these amendments, no one can fail to be impressed with the one pervading
purpose found in them all, lying at the foundation of each, and without which none of
them would have been even suggested; we mean the freedom of the slave race, the
security and firm establishment of that freedom, and the protection of the newly-made
freeman and citizen from the oppressions of those who had formerly exercised unlimited
dominion over him."); Donald E. Lively, Equal Protection and Moral Circumstance:
Accounting for Constitutional Basics, 59 FORDHAM L. REV. 485, 486 (1991) ("The
fourteenth amendment restructured basic law by recognizing and accounting for a class of
citizens that had been slighted in the original drafting process and demeaned by
subsequent jurisprudence.").
82. See Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 216 (1944).
83. See Lyng v. Castillo, 477 U.S. 635, 638 (1986) (holding that heightened scrutiny
follows history of discrimination, immutability of defining characteristics, and political
powerlessness); Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 493-95 (1954) (finding stigmatic
harm).
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Problems and questions with this methodology arose almost
immediately. 84  Should strict scrutiny be employed when the
discrimination is arguably benign and designed supposedly to help racial
minorities?8 5  What should count as unconstitutional action by state
actors? And, could the work of judicially mandated equality through the
use of heightened scrutiny be employed to protect other identifiable
discrete and insular minorities from supposedly invidious discrimination
by the government?
As the period of widespread overt official discrimination against racial
minorities came to close, it seemed likely, given human nature, that
governmental actors and bodies would continue to discriminate either
covertly or subconsciously. 86 If intent to discriminate is too hard to prove
in a period of more subtle prejudice, should discriminatory impact be
used as a proxy for intent? The Court, however, was unwilling to draw
such an inference, stating that although "[d]isporportionate impact is not
irrelevant, . . . it is not the sole touchstone of an invidious racial
discrimination forbidden by the Constitution. Standing alone, it does not
trigger the rule that racial classifications are to be subjected to the
strictest scrutiny and are justifiable only by the weightiest of
considerations.
87
When confronted with the very real possibility of covert or
subconscious racism, the Court had to balance the possibility of and
potential harm caused to an individual or group by this particularly
hideous type of invidious discrimination against the need for
governmental flexibility in drawing lines in the course of ordinary and
84. See Korematsu, 323 U.S. at 216-18. Korematsu was the first case to use the strict
scrutiny language, upholding Japanese internment on national security grounds. See id.
85. For discussion of affirmative action, see infra Part III.B.
86. See, e.g., Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 345 (2003) (Ginsburg, J., concurring)
("It is well documented that conscious and unconscious race bias, even rank
discrimination based on race, remain alive in our land, impeding realization of our highest
values and ideals."); McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 334 (1987) (Brennan, J.,
dissenting) ("'[s]ubtle, less consciously held racial attitudes' continue to be of concern
.... .(citation omitted) (quoting Turner v. Murray, 476 U.S. 28, 35 (1986))); Charles R.
Lawrence III, The Id, The Ego, and Equal Protection: Reckoning with Unconscious
Racism, 39 STAN. L. REV. 317, 322 (1987) ("[A] large part of the behavior that produces
racial discrimination is influenced by unconscious racial motivation."); cf. R.A. Lenhardt,
Understanding the Mark: Race, Stigma, and Equality in Context, 79 N.Y.U. L. REV. 803,
847 (2004) ("Racial stigma, more than intentional discrimination or theories of
unconscious racism, provides a frame for understanding the stubborn persistence of racism
and racial inequality in this country.").
87. Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 242 (1976) (citation omitted). To determine
when a facially neutral statute ought to receive strict scrutiny the Court has developed a
multi-factored test, which includes, as one factor, disparate impact. See Village of
Arlington Heights v. Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 266-68 (1977).
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legitimate policy making. 8 With the tiered system of categorization, this
balancing occurred sub silentio. Once the Court assessed the strength of
the competing interests, traditional categorization forced it to assign the
case, and all similar cases, to one of two rigid categories. The doctrinal
test for that category would then be applied mechanically, with the
outcome pre-ordained by the initial categorical assignment.
In Washington v. Davis9 and subsequent cases, the Court concluded
that, on balance, maintaining governmental flexibility and discretion in
regulating outweighed the need to protect racial minorities from secret
and hard to detect vestiges of racism in our political bodies.90 In Davis,
which upheld the use of a civil service exam for police officers despite its
effect of disproportionately disqualifying blacks from service on the
police force, the Court said:
A rule that a statute designed to serve neutral ends is
nevertheless invalid, absent compelling justification, if in
practice it benefits or burdens one race more than another
would be far reaching and would raise serious questions about,
and perhaps invalidate, a whole range of tax, welfare, public
service, regulatory, and licensing statutes that may be more
burdensome to the poor and to the average black than to the
more affluent white.
92
And, in McCleskey v. Kemp, which upheld a death sentence despite
evidence (the Baldus study) that blacks who are convicted of killing
whites have a disproportionately high possibility of receiving the death
penalty, 93 the Court held that "[a]s legislatures necessarily have wide
88. See, e.g., Davis, 426 U.S. at 239-48.
89. 426 U.S. 229 (1976).
90. See McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279,290-91 (1987); Davis, 426 U.S. at 246-48.
91. Davis, 426 U.S. at 248. In positing the slippery slope, the Court cited Frank I.
Goodman, De Facto School Segregation: A Constitutional and Empirical Analysis, 60 CAL.
L. REV. 275, 300 (1972), and William Silverman, Equal Protection, Economic Legislation,
and Racial Discrimination, 25 VAND. L. REV. 1183 (1972).
92. 481 U.S. 279 (1987).
93. Id. at 290-91. "As did the Court of Appeals, we assume the study is valid
statistically without reviewing the factual findings of the District Court." Id. at 291 n.7.
The dissent envisioned a conversation between McCleskey and his attorney:
At some point in this case, Warren McCleskey doubtless asked his lawyer
whether a jury was likely to sentence him to die. A candid reply to this question
would have been disturbing. First, counsel would have to tell McCleskey that
few of the details of the crime or of McCleskey's past criminal conduct were
more important than the fact that his victim was white. Furthermore, counsel
would feel bound to tell McCleskey that defendants charged with killing white
victims in Georgia are 4.3 times as likely to be sentenced to death as defendants
charged with killing blacks .... Finally, the assessment would not be complete
without the information that cases involving black defendants and white victims
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discretion in the choice of criminal laws and penalties, and as there were
legitimate reasons for the Georgia Legislature to adopt and maintain
capital punishment, we will not infer a discriminatory purpose on the
part of the State of Georgia" from the fact that a black defendant
accused of killing a white victim has the highest chance of receiving the
death penalty.94
Although other factors may have contributed to the Court's decision to
categorize disparate impact cases as noninvidious and, therefore, not
subject to microscopic judicial examination, it is clear that the political
branches' need for flexibility and discretion remained paramount in the
Court's collective mind. In a two-tiered system, applying strict scrutiny
in this context would raise the cost of governing to intolerable levels; or
so the Court concluded.
This same need for flexibility in governing permeates the Court's
venture into protecting other suspect and quasi-suspect classes. Having
concluded that overt racial discrimination against minorities was
invidious and should be subject to strict scrutiny review, the Court
decided that its work could be expanded to protect other discrete and
insular minorities from harmful majoritarian impulses.9 Under the two-
are more likely to result in a death sentence than cases featuring any other racial
combination of defendant and victim.
Id. at 321 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (citations omitted).
94. Id. at 298-99 (majority opinion) (citation omitted). The desire to preserve the
state's flexibility and discretion appeared to be of paramount concern in the Court's
rejection of the strict scrutiny standard or even the more nuanced approach of Batson v.
Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986). See McCleskey, 481 U.S. at 297 ("Implementation of these
laws necessarily requires discretionary judgments. Because discretion is essential to the
criminal justice process, we would demand exceptionally clear proof before we would infer
that the discretion has been abused. The unique nature of the decisions at issue in this
case also counsels against adopting such an inference from the disparities indicated by the
Baldus study."); id. at 314-15 ("McCleskey's claim, taken to its logical conclusion, throws
into serious question the principles that underlie our entire criminal justice system .... [I]f
we accepted McCleskey's claim that racial bias has impermissibly tainted the capital
sentencing decision, we could soon be faced with similar claims as to other types of
penalty." (citations omitted)); id. at 315-17 ("[T]he claim that his sentence rests on the
irrelevant factor of race easily could be extended to apply to claims based on unexplained
discrepancies that correlate to membership in other minority groups, and even to gender.
Similarly, since McCleskey's claim relates to the race of his victim, other claims could
apply with equally logical force to statistical disparities that correlate with the race or sex
of other actors in the criminal justice system, such as defense attorneys or judges."
(footnotes omitted)). In the area of jury selection, the Court has placed a greater
emphasis on ensuring that competing interests are given voice in claims of discriminatory
use of preemptory strikes. See Batson, 476 U.S. at 93-98. Justice Brennan's dissent argued
that the same consideration of competing interest that occurs with challenges to
preemptory strikes should occur during sentencing. See McCleskey, 481 U.S. at 337
(Brennan, J., dissenting).
95. See, e.g., Sugarman v. Dougall, 413 U.S. 634, 642 (1973).
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tiered system of review, getting classified as a discrete and insular
minority meant everything in any ensuing constitutional litigation.
Receiving the discrete and insular minority label meant that the
government could not single you out for adverse treatment without
showing that its classification was narrowly tailored to achieve a
compelling state interest.9 Being placed outside this label meant that the
state could use your characteristics to classify, even if it meant imposing
upon you a unique burden or denying you some benefit that others
received, so long as some rational basis existed for the classification.7
By what criteria would the Court judge whether a minority was
discrete and insular? To arrive at its stated criteria, the Court attempted
to decipher the characteristics that counseled in favor of judicial
intervention in the political process when a law classified in such a way asto brde acal .. 98
to burden racial minorities. It settled roughly upon three: history of
discrimination, political powerlessness, and immutability of the defining
characteristic." I argue that three decades of heightened scrutiny in
nonrace equal protection cases expose this reasoning as merely a hollow
cover for another agenda-placing a liberal egalitarian gloss on our
Constitution through judicial fiat. When this proved impossible under
the regime of categorical balancing, the Court abandoned rigid
adherence to the categorical system in favor of a system of ad hoc
balancing. We see this manifest in the cases in two ways: (a) by the
Court's classification of women and aliens as suspect or quasi-suspect
classes although they lack one or more of the characteristics necessary,
according to the Court's criteria, for inclusion in the group of discrete
and insular minorities, and (b) the exclusion of certain other groups, i.e.,
the mentally retarded, who much more clearly possess the requisite
characteristics.
First, neither women nor aliens fit neatly into the category of discrete
or quasi-discrete and insular minorities by the criteria established by the
96. See id. at 642-43.
97. See, e.g., Mass. Bd. of Ret. v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307, 313-14 (1976).
98. Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202,216 n.14 (1982).
99. See, e.g., Lyng v. Castillo, 477 U.S. 635, 638 (1986); San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist.
v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 28 (1973); James W. Ellis, On the "Usefulness" of Suspect
Classifications, 3 CONST. COMMENT. 375, 376 (1986); Simon, supra note 28, at 133-39
(providing a history of the characteristics used to identify suspect classes-including the
Rodriguez characteristics-and analyzing whether various groups often thought of as
suspect actually meet the characteristics); see also Toll v. Moreno, 458 U.S. 1, 23 (1982)
(Blackmun, J., concurring) (political powerlessness); Parham v. Hughes, 441 U.S. 347, 351
(1979) (plurality opinion) (immutability of the defining characteristic); Mathews v. Lucas,
427 U.S. 495, 506 (1976) (history of discrimination).
[Vol. 55:5
Illusions of Liberty and Equality
Court. While it is true that one's sex is immutable'° and that for much of
this country's history women have lived and labored under a myriad of
legal and cultural barriers, it is difficult to argue that women, who
comprise a majority of the population, are so politically powerless as torequre te juic ay's . 101
require the judiciary's protection. Classifying aliens generically as
discrete and insular is even more suspect. Aliens can become United
States citizens in three to five years after receiving permanent
residency,' °2 thus rendering this characteristic mutable in time. Aliens
are also not a discrete homogenous class that has a history of suffering at
the hands of the majority population. Certainly some aliens-Chinese,
Irish, Italians, and Mexicans for example-have experienced a history of
discriminatory treatment.'03 But, other aliens-British, other immigrants
from northern Europe, and Cubans fleeing Castro in the 1960s-have
experienced a much more welcoming posture upon arrival in the United
States.1 4 And, although aliens lack the franchise, some groups of aliens
have citizen surrogates who vote or advocate their interests.
100. But see Katherine M. Franke, The Central Mistake of Sex Discrimination Law:
The Disaggregation of Sex from Gender, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 99 (1995) ("[Slexual
equality jurisprudence must abandon its reliance upon biology in favor of an underlying
fundamental right to determine gender independent of biological sex.").
101. See, e.g., United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 575 (1996) (Scalia, J., dissenting)
("It is hard to consider women a 'discrete and insular minorit[y]' unable to employ the
'political processes ordinarily to be relied upon,' when they constitute a majority of the
electorate. And the suggestion that they are incapable of exerting that political power
smacks of the same paternalism that the Court so roundly condemns." (alteration in
original)); ELY, supra note 77, at 164-67; Anita K. Blair, The Equal Protection Clause and
Single-Sex Public Education: United States v. Virginia and Virginia Military Institute, 6
SETON HALL CONST. L.J. 999, 1009-12 (1996). But see Frontiero v. Richardson 411 U.S.
677, 685-87 (1973) (plurality opinion) (recounting a history of formal legal discrimination
against women, acknowledging "that the position of women in America has improved
markedly in recent decades, [and concluding that] women still face pervasive, although at
times more subtle, discrimination" (footnotes omitted)).
102. 8 U.S.C. § 1430(c) (2000), amended by 8 U.S.C.A. § 1430(a) (West Supp. 2005)
(explaining that aliens can become United States citizens in five years or three years if the
alien is married to a United States citizen).
103. See, e.g., Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U.S. 698, 732 (1893) (upholding a
congressional act mandating that a Chinese alien can only use a White witness to prove his
residency); see also PHILIP PERLMUTTER, DIVIDED WE FALL 124-26, 187-90, 195-96, 222
(1992) (discussing the historical treatment of the Chinese, Italians, and Mexicans).
104. PERLMUTTER, supra note 103, at 247, 281 (discussing northern European and
Cuban immigrants); Tracy Fujimoto, Comment, Elian Doesn't Live Here Anymore: One
Little Boy in the Maze of U.S. Immigration & Family Law, 23 HAw. L. REV. 249, 253-54
(2000).
105. See, e.g., Mexican American Legal Defense and Education Fund, About Us,
http://maldef.org/about/index.htm (last visited Sept. 20, 2005) (defining its mission to
"foster sound public policies, laws and programs to safeguard the civil rights of the 40
million Latinos living in the United States"); The Asian Pacific American Legal Center,
http://apalc.org (last visited Sept. 20, 2005) (seeking "'[t]o advocate for civil rights, provide
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Second, the Court has refused to provide special judicial protection to
members of other groups who more clearly fit the Court's criteria of a
discrete and insular minority."'6 And, the Court's reasoning of who is in
and who is out has been faulty and incoherent at best. City of Cleburne
v. Cleburne Living Center, Inc.,107 a case in which the Court refused to• 108
treat the mentally retarded as a suspect or quasi-suspect class,
illustrates my arguments. Justice Marshall, dissenting in relevant part,
uses the Court's stated criteria to make a convincing case for applying
intermediate scrutiny in cases where the government has used mental
retardation as the basis for classification. °9
Immutability of the characteristic? Yes! Political powerlessness?
Check! The mentally retarded are no less politically powerless, and in
many ways more so, than racial minorities and women.1 ° History of
discrimination? Check! "[T]he mentally retarded have been subject to a
'lengthy and tragic history' of segregation and discrimination that can
only be called grotesque.""' 1 Marshall continued:
Fueled by the rising tide of Social Darwinism, the "science" of
eugenics, and the extreme xenophobia of those years, leading
medical authorities and others began to portray the
"feebleminded" as a "menace to society and civilization . . .
responsible in a large degree for many, if not all, of our social
problems." A regime of state-mandated segregation and
degradation soon emerged that in its virulence and bigotry
rivaled, and indeed paralleled, the worst excesses of Jim Crow.
Massive custodial institutions were built to warehouse the
retarded for life; the aim was to halt reproduction of the
retarded . . . . Retarded children were categorically excluded
from public schools, based on the false stereotype that all were
ineducable and on the purported need to protect nonretarded
legal services and education, and build coalitions to positively influence and impact Asian
Pacific Americans and to create a more equitable and harmonious society"').
106. See, e.g., City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. 432,435 (1985).
107. 473 U.S. 432 (1985).
108. Id. at 435.
109. See id. at 469-70 (Marshall, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in
part).
110. See id. at 464 ("As of 1979, most States still categorically disqualified 'idiots' from
voting, without regard to individual capacity and with discretion to exclude left in the
hands of low-level election officials."). Additionally, even with the franchise it seems
almost too obvious to state that the ability to fundraise and organize will never be on par
with those with full mental capacity in their ability to fundraise and organize.
111. Id. at 461 (citation omitted) (quoting Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438
U.S. 265, 303 (1978) (plurality opinion)).
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children from them. State laws deemed the retarded "unfit for
citizenship."'
' 2
Given the fact that mental retardation might be a relevant defining
characteristic for some governmental action-the government needs
some flexibility in dealing with the mentally retarded-Marshall would
have applied intermediate scrutiny, not strict scrutiny."3 "The fact that
retardation may be deemed a constitutional irrelevancy in some
circumstances is enough, given the history of discrimination the retarded
have suffered, to require careful judicial review of classifications singling
out the retarded for special burdens." 4 Marshall argued that "careful
review is required to separate the permissible from the invalid in
classifications relying on retardation.""-'
Despite its own criteria and Marshall's compelling argument using that
criteria, the Court refused to classify the mentally retarded as a suspect
or quasi-suspect class for equal protection purposes." '  Therefore,
legislation and other governmental action that classifies based on mental
retardation are subject merely to rational basis review." 7 In declining the
invitation to apply heightened scrutiny, the Court focused on the
undeniably relevant distinctions between the mentally retarded and
others. "They are thus different, immutably so, in relevant respects
. .. .,, Ignoring the dark history and refusing to use heightened
scrutiny to test and probe individual cases of mental retardation
classification, the Court reached the unsubstantiated conclusion "that
governmental consideration of those differences in the vast majority of
112. Id. at 461-63 (first alteration in original) (footnotes omitted); see also Marie
Appleby, Note, The Mentally Retarded: The Need for Intermediate Scrutiny, 3 B.C. THIRD
WORLD L.J. 109, 112-17 (1987) (chronicling discrimination against the mentally retarded).
The Court itself was not immune from the anthropological assumptions of Social
Darwinian theory, adopting those assumptions in its substantive due process jurisprudence
in Lochner. See Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 75 (1905) (Holmes, J., dissenting)
("The Fourteenth Amendment does not enact Mr. Herbert Spencer's Social Statics."); see
also Scott v. Sandford (Dred Scott), 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393, 407 (1857) (stating that Blacks,
whether free or slave, were "regarded as beings of an inferior order, and altogether unfit
to associate with the white race, either in social or political relations; and so far inferior,
that they had no rights which the white man was bound to respect"). If the Court
succumbs in one era to the temptation to read into the Constitution the then currently
fashionable theories about the nature of humanity, it would be foolish to think that the
current Court is above such temptation.
113. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. at 469 (Marshall, J., concurring in the judgment in
part and dissenting in part).
114. Id. at 470.
115. Id. at 469.
116. Id. at 435 (majority opinion).
117. See id. at 446.
118. Id. at 442.
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situations is not only legitimate but also desirable."' ' 9 And, "merely
requiring the legislature to justify its efforts [under heightened scrutiny]
may lead it to refrain from acting at all" to the detriment of the mentally
retarded. 2 "Especially given the wide variation in the abilities and
needs of the retarded themselves, governmental bodies must have a
certain amount of flexibility and freedom from judicial oversight in
shaping and limiting their remedial efforts. 1.2'
In a move that conflicted with one of the reasons for using heightened
scrutiny in gender cases, the Court also said that heightened scrutiny was
not needed because "the legislative response, which [the Court assumed
was positive,] could hardly have occurred and survived without public
support, negates any claim that the mentally retarded are politically
powerless in the sense that they have no ability to attract the attention of
the lawmakers.1 22 In contrast, the plurality in Frontiero v. Richardson,23
reasoned that heightened scrutiny was appropriate in gender cases partly
because "over the past decade, Congress has itself manifested an
increasing sensitivity to sex-based classifications.... Thus, Congress itself
has concluded that classifications based upon sex are inherently
invidious, and this conclusion of a coequal branch of Government is not
without significance to the question presently under consideration." '24
Marshall's dissent in Cleburne exposes this inconsistency: "It is natural
that evolving standards of equality come to be embodied in legislation.
When that occurs, courts should look to the fact of such change as a
source of guidance on evolving principles of equality."'25 Referring to
Frontiero, Marshall continued: "In an analysis the Court today ignores,
the Court reached this very conclusion when it extended heightened
119. Id. at 444. The Court knows that the legislation is legitimate and desirable
because "a civilized and decent society expects and approves such legislation." Id. Are
we to conclude from this that while the society of the mid-1980s was civilized and decent,
earlier generations that institutionalized and lobotomized the mentally retarded were not
civilized and decent? By what criteria have they determined that society is civilized and
decent? If society is now civilized and decent then why does the Court continue to use
strict scrutiny to strike down laws that classify based on race, gender, sexual conduct?
120. Id.
121. Id. at 445 (emphasis added).
122. Id.
123. 411 U.S. 677 (1973).
124. Id. at 687-88 (plurality opinion) (footnotes omitted). But see id. at 692 (Powell, J.,
concurring) ("It seems to me that this reaching out to pre-empt by judicial action a major
political decision which is currently in process of resolution does not reflect appropriate
respect for duly prescribed legislative processes."); RONALD DWORKIN, FREEDOM'S LAW
26-31 (1996).
125. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. at 466 (Marshall, J., concurring in the judgment in
part and dissenting in part).
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scrutiny to gender classifications and drew on parallel legislative
developments to support that extension. ,,26
In Cleburne, the Court also squarely faced the legislative and judicial
nightmare that would be created if it took its own criteria (immutability,
history of discrimination, and political powerlessness) for discreteness
and insularity seriously.
[I]f the large and amorphous class of the mentally retarded were
deemed quasi-suspect . . . , it would be difficult to find a
principled way to distinguish a variety of other groups who have
perhaps immutable disabilities setting them off from others,
who cannot themselves mandate the desired legislative
responses, and who can claim some degree of prejudice from at
least part of the public at large. One need mention in this
respect only the aging, the disabled, the mentally ill, and the
infirm. We are reluctant to set out on that course, and we
127decline to do so.
In the end, the need to provide the governing authorities room to
maneuver in setting policy with respect to the mentally retarded and
other potential discrete or quasi-discrete and insular minorities, led the
Court to abandon any attempt to expand the list of suspect and quasi-
suspect classes even if the individual litigant belonged to a class that had
immutable characteristics, was politically powerless, and had a history of
suffering discrimination at the hands of the majority. The need for
government flexibility, not the recognized potential for invidious
discrimination, has guided the Court's categorization for equal protection
purposes. Of course, this is not the totality of the Cleburne story or the
end of the Court's analysis. Part III will tell the rest of the story.
B. Fundamental Rights and Substantive Due Process
A two-tiered system of categorical balancing also developed in the
Court's fundamental rights jurisprudence under the Equal Protection
and Due Process Clauses.1 8 Here, the tiered system seemed to serve the
cause of legitimacy: did the Court have authority to protect unwritten
rights and, if so, by what criteria would such rights be identified? Part of
the concern here was the chastisement the Court had received over its
126. Id. "[E]ven when judicial action has catalyzed legislative change, that change
certainly does not eviscerate the underlying constitutional principle. The Court, for
example, has never suggested that race-based classifications became any less suspect once
extensive legislation had been enacted on the subject." Id. at 467.
127. Id. at 445-46 (majority opinion). Are the classes of aliens, women, or African-
Americans any less large or amorphous?
128. Mass. Bd. of Ret. v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307, 318 (1976) (Marshall, J., dissenting).
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substantive due process cases of the Lochner era.'2 9  In Griswold v.
Connecticut,130 the Court attempted to distance itself from this discredited
period: "Overtones of some arguments suggest that Lochner v. New
York should be our guide. But we decline that invitation .... We do not
sit as a super-legislature to determine the wisdom, need, and propriety of
laws that touch economic problems, business affairs, or social
conditions.' 13' Elsewhere, the Court has said:
Substantive due process has at times been a treacherous field
for this Court. There are risks when the judicial branch gives
enhanced protection to certain substantive liberties without the
guidance of the more specific provisions of the Bill of Rights.
As the history of the Lochner era demonstrates, there is reason
for concern lest the only limits to such judicial intervention
become the predilections of those who happen at the time to be
Members of this Court.1
32
By categorizing a certain few liberties as fundamental and therefore
worthy of heightened judicial protection, the Court could appear
constrained by external and impersonal markers, limiting the possibility
that the Justices would succumb to the temptation to usurp legislative
authority.3 3  According to the Court, "[o]ur Nation's history, legal
129. See HOWARD GILLMAN, THE CONSTITUTION BESIEGED 132-37 (1993); Barry
Friedman, The History of the Countermajoritarian Difficulty, Part Three: The Lesson of
Lochner, 76 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1383, 1436-38 (2001).
130. 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
131. Id. at 481-82 (citations omitted).
132. Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 502 (1977); see also Bowers v.
Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 194 (1986) ("The Court is most vulnerable and comes nearest to
illegitimacy when it deals with judge-made constitutional law having little or no cognizable
roots in the language or design of the Constitution."), overruled by Lawrence v. Texas, 539
U.S. 558 (2003); Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 720 (1997) ("[W]e 'ha[ve] always
been reluctant to expand the concept of substantive due process because guideposts for
responsible decisionmaking in this uncharted area are scarce and open-ended.' By
extending constitutional protection to an asserted right or liberty interest, we, to a great
extent, place the matter outside the arena of public debate and legislative action. We must
therefore 'exercise the utmost care whenever we are asked to break new ground in this
field,' lest the liberty protected by the Due Process Clause be subtly transformed into the
policy preferences of the Members of this Court." (second alteration in original) (citations
omitted) (quoting Collins v. City of Harker Heights, 503 U.S. 115, 125 (1992))).
133. This temptation was foreseen by the founders. See Essays of Brutus No. 11, in
THE ESSENTIAL FEDERALIST AND ANTI-FEDERALIST PAPERS 81, 85 (David Wootton
ed., 2003) ("[J]udges will be interested to extend the powers of the courts, and to construe
the constitution as much as possible, in such a way as to favor it; and that they will do it,
appears probable."); Letter from Thomas Jefferson to William Charles Jarvis (Sept. 28,
1820), in 15 THE WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 276, 277 (Andrew A. Lipscomb &
Albert Ellery Bergh eds., 1903) ("Our judges are as honest as other men, and not more so.
They have, with others, the same passions for party, for power, and the privilege of their
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traditions, and practices thus provide[d] the crucial 'guideposts for
responsible decisionmaking,"' providing the Court with criteria for
determining what liberties were fundamental. The right to privacy
"relating to marriage, procreation, contraception, family relationships,
and child rearing and education" made up the bulk of these fundamental
rights, 3 5 with their roots supposedly in the Lochner era cases of Pierce v.
Society of Sisters'
6 and Meyer v. Nebraska.
1 3 7
Under this formula, when the Court determined that a governmental
entity had attempted to restrict a fundamental right, it applied strict
scrutiny, requiring the state to prove that the restriction was necessary to
achieve a compelling state interest. 3 8  In other words, it bracketed the
right deemed fundamental, limiting the right to self-governance, by
placing the fundamental right beyond the reach of legislative action and
democratic correction. 39 Where no fundamental right is at stake, judicial
deference is given to the state, and the challenger is required to prove
that the law is not "rationally related to legitimate government
interests.
'' 40
corps. . . . [T]heir power the more dangerous as they are in office for life, and not
responsible, as the other functionaries are, to the elective control.").
134. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 721 (quoting Collins, 503 U.S. at 125). The Court
elaborated:
Our established method of substantive-due-process analysis has two primary
features: First, we have regularly observed that the Due Process Clause specially
protects those fundamental rights and liberties which are, objectively, "deeply
rooted in this Nation's history and tradition," and "implicit in the concept of
ordered liberty," such that "neither liberty nor justice would exist if they were
sacrificed." Second, we have required in substantive-due-process cases a "careful
description" of the asserted fundamental liberty interest.
Id. at 720-21 (citations omitted).
135. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 152-53 (1973) (citations omitted).
136. 268 U.S. 510, 534-35 (1925) (striking down an act requiring parents or guardians
to send children of a certain age to public schools because the act "unreasonably interferes
with the liberty of parents and guardians to direct the upbringing and education of
children under their control").
137. 262 U.S. 390, 403 (1923) (striking down a Nebraska law banning the teaching of
languages other than English prior to the eighth grade because the law is "arbitrary and
without reasonable relation to any end within the competency of the State").
138. E.g., Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 721 (stating that the government is forbidden "'to
infringe ... "fundamental" liberty interests at all, no matter what process is provided,
unless the infringement is narrowly tailored to serve a compelling state interest"'
(alteration in original) (quoting Reno v. Flores, 507 U.S. 292, 302 (1993))); Roe, 410 U.S.
at 155 ("Where certain 'fundamental rights' are involved, the Court has held that
regulation limiting these rights may be justified only by a 'compelling state interest,' and
that legislative enactments must be narrowly drawn .. " (citations omitted)).
139. See generally Michael A. Scaperlanda, Replies to Professor Chemerinsky: In
Defense of Representative Democracy, 54 OKLA. L. REV. 38 (2001).
140. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 728.
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Requiring that the right be deemed fundamental-that is, "deeply
rooted in our legal tradition" as "a threshold ... before requiring more
than a reasonable relation to a legitimate state interest to justify the
action ... avoids the need for complex balancing of competing interests
in every case' 41 and "tends to rein in the subjective elements that are
necessarily present in due process judicial review. , 141 Much ink has been
spilled and trees felled discussing the inconsistencies and incoherencies
present in the Supreme Court's substantive due process jurisprudence;
therefore, I will remember, without restating, those arguments.
III. JUDICIAL FORAYS INTO AD Hoc BALANCING
To relieve its sense of claustrophobia brought on by the closedness of
its categorical balancing, the Court began experimenting with ad hoc
approaches fairly early.143 Ad hoc balancing has allowed the Court to
retain primacy of place for governmental flexibility while giving the
Court itself more discretion to overturn state action where the Court saw
no need for governmental flexibility in a particular instance but desired
to protect what it saw as important liberty and equality interests. This
move toward ad hoc balancing maximizes judicial power, allowing judges
to make normative decisions about the relationship between the
individual and the state on a case-by-case basis.
A. Early Forays
Although the Court declined to categorize the mentally retarded as a
suspect or quasi-suspect class in Cleburne,'44 that was not the end of the
story. "Our refusal to recognize the retarded as a quasi-suspect class
does not leave them entirely unprotected from invidious discrimination.
To withstand equal protection review, legislation that distinguishes
between the mentally retarded and others must be rationally related to a
legitimate governmental purpose.' 45 But, the Court's use of the rational
141. Id. at 722.
142. Id.
143. See U.S. Dep't of Agric. v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528, 529 (1973) (striking down
federal food stamp provisions, which only allowed food stamps in households where all
members were related, on the ground that the relatedness requirement was an irrational
method for attempting to curb fraud). The Court said: "For if the constitutional
conception of 'equal protection of the laws' means anything, it must at the very least mean
that a bare congressional desire to harm a politically unpopular group [hippies] cannot
constitute a legitimate governmental interest." Id. at 534.
144. See supra notes 107-11 and accompanying text.
145. City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 446 (1985). The Court
further explained that "[t]his standard, we believe, affords government the latitude
necessary both to pursue policies designed to assist the retarded in realizing their full
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basis test in Cleburne more closely resembled the Court's test in
Lochner146 than Williamson v. Lee Optical of Oklahoma, Inc. "7 Citing
United States Department of Agriculture v. Moreno,4 1 the Court stated
two broad principles for the application of this heightened form of
rational basis scrutiny; the first pertaining to the means and the second to
the ends of governmental action: (1) "[t]he State may not rely on a
classification whose relationship to an asserted goal is so attenuated as to
render the distinction arbitrary or irrational"; 49  and (2) "some
objectives-such as 'a bare ...desire to harm a politically unpopular
group'-are not legitimate state interests."'"5  The Court framed the
question: "May the city require the permit for this facility when other
care and multiple-dwelling facilities are freely permitted?"'' raising
questions regarding the degree of under- and overinclusivity, factors




Placing the burden on the city, the Court said: "'LTJhe City never justifies
potential, and to freely and efficiently engage in activities that burden the retarded in what
is essentially an incidental manner." Id.
146. Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 57-58 (1905). The values protected by
Cleburne were very different from the values protected by Lochner, but placing the
burden on the state to prove rationality or reasonableness was similar. In Lochner, the
Court could not imagine a maximum hour law being a health or safety regulation, and in
Cleburne, it could not envision the zoning ordinance as a decision about property values.
Cf. Cass R. Sunstein, The Supreme Court, 1995 Term-Foreword: Leaving Things
Undecided, 110 HARV. L. REV. 4, 62 (1996) (concluding that the city's concern for
property values was a "poorly fitting but probably rational justification[]").
147. 348 U.S. 483, 487-88 (1955).
To be sure, the Court does not label its handiwork heightened scrutiny, and
perhaps the method employed must hereafter be called "second order" rational-
basis review rather than "heightened scrutiny." But however labeled, the
rational-basis test invoked today is most assuredly not the rational-basis test of
Williamson v. Lee Optical of Oklahoma, Inc.
Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. at 458 (Marshall, J., concurring in the judgment in part and
dissenting in part) (citations omitted).
148. 413 U.S. 528 (1973).
149. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. at 446. What happened to the presumption of
constitutionality? Usually the Court doesn't probe and test to determine the degree of
attenuation. See supra text accompanying notes 37-50.
150. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. at 446-47 (alteration in original) (citation omitted)
(quoting Moreno, 413 U.S. at 534). What evidence is there of the state's mere desire to
harm such a group? How does the Court know this? In short, it seems unlikely that the
Court is acting in a judicial capacity here in making this determination unless it is
implicitly drawing an inference from evidence or taking judicial notice.
151. Id. at 448.
152. See Vance v. Bradley, 440 U.S. 93, 108 (1979) ("Even if the classification involved
here is to some extent both underinclusive and overinclusive, and hence the line drawn by
Congress imperfect, it is nevertheless the rule that in a case like this 'perfection is by no
means required."' (quoting Phillips Chem. Co. v. Dumas Indep. Sch. Dist., 361 U.S. 376,
385 (1960))).
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its apparent view that other people can live under such "crowded"
conditions when mentally retarded persons cannot."' 53  In finding the
ordinance irrational, the Court concluded that "requiring the permit in
this case appears to us to rest on an irrational prejudice against the
mentally retarded.'
154
Justice Marshall responded, observing that
[tihe Court, for example, concludes that legitimate concerns
for fire hazards or the serenity of the neighborhood do not
justify singling out respondents to bear the burdens of these
concerns. . . .Yet under the traditional and most minimal
version of the rational-basis test, "reform may take one step at a
time, addressing itself to the phase of the problem which seems
most acute to the legislative mind."'55
He continued: "The 'record' is said not to support the ordinance's
classifications, but under the traditional standard we do not sift through
the record to determine whether policy decisions are squarely supported
by a firm factual foundation.' '156 In short, it was clear that the Court was
applying more scrutiny to the government's actions in Cleburne than one
would expect from a rational basis review.'57
Marshall was building his argument partly on the back of Plyler, and its
use of heightened scrutiny to strike down a Texas law that denied illegal
153. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. at 450 (quoting Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc. v. City of
Cleburne, 726 F.2d 191, 202 (5th Cir. 1984)).
154. Id. The City offered several justifications for its ordinance, including "avoiding
concentration of population and [] lessening congestion of the streets." Id. If the Court
had been applying minimum rational basis, it would have upheld the City's decision. What
the Court characterized as "the negative attitude of the majority of property owners ... as
well as .. . the fears of elderly residents of the neighborhood," id. at 448, could have been
characterized as permissible concern with property values. Discussing the city's
justifications for the statute, Professor Sunstein opines: "Unquestionably these concerns
would satisfy ordinary rationality review as traditionally formulated. For purposes of that
standard, it is not decisive-nor even relevant-that there was a poor fit between these
ends and the means chosen by Cleburne." Sunstein, supra note 146, at 61.
155. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. at 458 (Marshall, J., concurring in the judgment in
part and dissenting in part) (quoting Williamson v. Lee Optical of Okla., Inc., 348 U.S.
483, 489 (1955)).
156. Id. (citation omitted). "Finally, the Court further finds it 'difficult to believe' that
the retarded present different or special hazards inapplicable to other groups. In normal
circumstances, the burden is not on the legislature to convince the Court that the lines it
has drawn are sensible; legislation is presumptively constitutional .. " Id. at 459.
157. See, e.g., Michael Klarman, An Interpretive History of Modern Equal Protection,
90 MICH. L. REV. 213, 234 (1991) (citing Cleburne, Klarman says that "the last two
decades of equal protection development are replete with instances in which the Court
mouthed rationality language while surreptitiously substituting a heightened review
standard, which sometimes was later openly espoused"); Sullivan, supra note 80, at 61
n.248 ("[D]e facto intermediate scrutiny occurs whenever the Court escalates nominal
rationality review, see, e.g., City of Cleburne .... (citations omitted)).
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alien children a free public education . In Plyler, the Court rejected the
use of strict scrutiny on the dual grounds that "[u]ndocumented aliens
cannot be treated as a suspect class because their presence in this country
[is] in violation of federal law" and education is not a fundamental
right.'59 But, rather than defer to the legislature's judgment as would be
the norm in the usual case, the Court decided that "[i]n determining the
rationality of the law,"''  it had to weigh the countervailing "costs to the
Nation and to the innocent children who are [the law's] victims."' 6'
Given the stigmatic harm caused by this law, which "imposes a lifetime
hardship on a discrete class of children not accountable for their
disabling status," 162 the Court concluded that the law "can hardly be
considered rational unless it furthers some substantial goal of the
State.' ' 163 Using arguments from Graham, a strict scrutiny case,164 the
Court minimized Texas's interest in reserving scarce educational dollars
for those legally in the state by reminding the nation that the federal
government, not the states, possesses the power to make alienage
classifications. 165 Employing simple ad hoc balancing language, the Court
concluded that "[i]t is thus clear that whatever savings might be achieved
by denying these children an education, they are wholly insubstantial in
light of the costs involved to these children, the State, and the Nation.',
166
The move away from categorical balancing was not confined solely to
the equal protection field. In Roe v. Wade,'67 the Court decided that the
fundamental right to privacy was "broad enough to encompass a
woman's decision whether or not to terminate her pregnancy.'
168
Employing strict scrutiny, the Court said that a state's interest in
158. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. at 469 (Marshall, J., concurring in the judgment in
part and dissenting in part) (using Plyler to show that the Court's "heightened-scrutiny
precedents belie the claim that a characteristic must virtually always be irrelevant to
warrant heightened scrutiny").
159. Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 223 (1982).
160. Id. at 223-24.
161. Id. at 224.
162. Id. at 223.
163. Id. at 224.
164. For a discussion of Graham, see supra notes 27-30 and accompanying text.
165. Plyler, 457 U.S. at 225 ("The obvious need for delicate policy judgments has
counseled the Judicial Branch to avoid intrusion into [the alienage] field. But this
traditional caution does not persuade us that unusual deference must be shown the
classification embodied in [this law]. The States enjoy no power with respect to the
classification of aliens." (citation omitted)). Citing Graham, the Court said that "a
concern for the preservation of resources standing alone can hardly justify the
classification used in allocating those resources." Id. at 227.
166. Id. at 230.
167. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
168. Id. at 153.
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maternal health is compelling after the first trimester'69 and that the
State's interest in the life of the fetus became compelling at viability. 7°
Early in her tenure on the Court, Justice O'Connor concluded that "[t]he
Roe framework [was] clearly on a collision course with itself." '' The
rigid all or nothing approach inherent in categorical balancing needed to
give way in the abortion context for two reasons. First, Roe requires "the
State [to] continuously and conscientiously study contemporary medical
and scientific literature in order to determine" the viability of particular
regulations during any given point in the pregnancy. 72 "Assuming that
legislative bodies are able to engage in this exacting task, it is difficult to
believe that our Constitution requires that they do it as a prelude to
protecting the health of their citizens.' ' 73 Second, the trimester approach
undervalued the state's interest in maternal health and fetal life.
According to O'Connor, "the State possesses compelling interests in the
protection of potential human life and in maternal health throughout
pregnancy. ' 74  O'Connor proposed that an "'undue burden' [test be
applied as a] threshold inquiry that must be conducted before this Court"
applies strict scrutiny to an abortion regulation.'7 1 If no undue burden is
present, the Court would apply a rational basis standard of review and- • •176
defer to the legislative judgment.
O'Connor's opinion in Akron did not address how she would resolve a
regulation that unduly burdened access to an abortion. In fact, her
framework seemed on a collision course with itself: when a woman's
constitutional right to an abortion clashes with the state's compelling
interest in protecting fetal life throughout pregnancy, who wins? Her
answer came in the joint opinion in Planned Parenthood of Southeastern
169. Id. at 163 ("With respect to the State's important and legitimate interest in the
health of the mother, the 'compelling point' . . . is at approximately the end of the first
trimester.").
170. Id.
171. City of Akron v. Akron Ctr. for Reprod. Health, Inc., 462 U.S. 416, 458 (1983)
(O'Connor, J., dissenting), overruled by Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S.
883 (1992).
172. Id. at 456.
173. Id. (footnote omitted). Justice O'Connor continued:
It is even more difficult to believe that this Court, without the resources available
to those bodies entrusted with making legislative choices, believes itself
competent to make these inquiries and to revise these standards every time the
American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists (ACOG) or similar group
revises its views about what is and what is not appropriate medical procedure in
this area.
Id.
174. Id. at 461.
175. Id. at 463.
176. Id. at 453.
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Pennsylvania v. Casey.177 Reaffirming Roe's holding that a woman has a
constitutionally protected right to have an abortion,178 the Court rejected
Roe's "rigid trimester framework" 7 9  and concluded that it
"misconceive[d] the nature of the pregnant woman's interest[] [and]
undervalue[d] the State's interest in potential life."' 80 To reconcile these
competing interests, the Court reaffirmed that "[b]efore viability, the
State's interests are not strong enough to support a prohibition of
abortion or the imposition of a substantial obstacle to the woman's
effective right to elect the procedure.""18 To grant greater flexibility for
the state in regulating abortion, the Court adopted the undue burden
rubric: "To protect the central right recognized by Roe v. Wade while at
the same time accommodating the State's profound interest in potential
life, we will employ the undue burden analysis .... 182
In Casey, the Court had determined that its rigid categorical balancing
had taken too much maneuvering room away from the state. The undue
burden test became a type of ad hoc balancing in the abortion context,
protecting a woman's right to an abortion and providing a small measure
of flexibility to the state to promote its interest in fetal life and maternal
health, while continuing to locate ultimate power in the Court. 
183
177. 505 U.S. 833 (1992).
178. Id. at 846 ("Roe's essential holding [includes] a recognition of the right of the
woman to choose to have an abortion before viability ... .
179. Id. at 873 (plurality opinion).
180. Id. at 875. "The woman's liberty is not so unlimited, however, that from the
outset the State cannot show its concern for the life of the unborn .... i Id. at 869.
181. Id. at 846 (majority opinion). Viability provided the critical line for two reasons.
First, Roe's holding on viability "was a reasoned statement, elaborated with great care."
Id. at 870 (plurality opinion). Second, "viability... is the time at which there is a realistic
possibility of maintaining.., life outside the womb." Id. The Court acknowledged that it
"must justify the lines [it] draw[s]. And there is no line other than viability which is more
workable." Id. But see Akron Ctr. for Reprod. Health, 462 U.S. at 461 (O'Connor, J.,
dissenting) ("The choice of viability as the point at which the state interest in potential life
becomes compelling is no less arbitrary than choosing any point before viability or any
point afterward.").
182. Casey, 505 U.S. at 878 (plurality opinion).
183. See Stenberg v. Carhart, 530 U.S. 914, 920-22, 929-30 (2000) (exercising the
Court's power to strike down a state statute prohibiting even late term partial-birth
abortions on the grounds that the statute did not contain a health exception). Referring to
its role in governing, the Casey Court said: "Their [the People] belief in themselves as ... a
people (who aspire to live according to the rule of law] is not readily separable from their
understanding of the Court invested with the authority to decide their constitutional cases
and speak before all others for their constitutional ideals." Casey, 505 U.S. at 868; see also
Michael Stokes Paulsen, Captain James T. Kirk and the Enterprise of Constitutional
Interpretation: Some Modest Proposals from the Twenty-Third Century, 59 ALB. L. REV.
671, 674-75 (1995).
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The Casey Court also articulated a new basis for finding and defining
constitutionally protected liberty interests. Basing its understanding of
liberty in philosophical notions of liberal autonomy, the Court opined:
"At the heart of liberty is the right to define one's own concept of
existence, of meaning, of the universe, and of the mystery of human
life."' 84 "[I]ntimate and personal choices [based on these beliefs,] choices
central to personal dignity and autonomy, are central to the liberty
protected by the Fourteenth Amendment."'" 5 In 1992, one was left to
wonder whether the move away from the rigid two-tier categorical
balancing might provide the Court the necessary flexibility to protect a
broader scope of autonomy based liberty interests utilizing the mystery
of life passage's expansive possibilities. This possibility seemed unlikely
after the Court returned to its two-tier analysis in Glucksberg, 6 rejecting
Judge Reinhardt's use of the mystery passage to support a constitutional
right to assisted suicide.' But, as we will see below, Lawrence v. Texas 8
reopens the door to these uncharted waters.' 89
B. Grutter
With respect to affirmative action, it is well known that the Court
spent seventeen years attempting to settle on a standard for reviewing
the constitutionality of affirmative action programs. 9°  In City of
Richmond v. J. A. Croson Co.,'9' the Court finally decided that strict
scrutiny was the appropriate level for reviewing state affirmative action
programs under the Fourteenth Amendment. 2 A year later, the Court
184. Casey, 505 U.S. at 851.
185. Id.
186. See Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 720-22 (1997).
187. Id. at 726. Judge Reinhardt had concluded "[1like the decision of whether or not
to have an abortion, the decision how and when to die is one of 'the most intimate and
personal choices a person may make in a lifetime,' a choice 'central to personal dignity and
autonomy."' Compassion in Dying v. Washington, 79 F.3d 790, 813 (9th Cir. 1996), rev'd
sub nom. Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702 (1997). Judge Reinhardt continued:
"Following the approach of the Court in Casey, we note that there is also an extensive
body of legal, medical, and sociological literature, lending support to the conclusion that a
prohibition on physician assistance imposes an onerous burden on terminally ill,
competent adults who wish to hasten their deaths." Id. at 835 (citation omitted)
(footnotes omitted).
188. 539 U.S. 558 (2003).
189. See infra Part III.C.
190. See Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 218-27 (1995).
191. 488 U.S. 469 (1989).
192. Id. at 494 (plurality opinion). The Court emphasized that although Congress was
given constitutional authority to remedy past discrimination, states and their subdivisions
were not given the same authority. Id. at 490. Thus, strict scrutiny was the appropriate
standard of review for state actions because "strict scrutiny [would] 'smoke out'
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applied intermediate scrutiny in upholding the FCC's policy that gave
minorities a station ownership preference.' 3  Repudiating Metro
Broadcasting, the Court in Adarand Constructors stated:
[T]he Court's cases through Croson had established three
general propositions with respect to governmental racial
classifications. First, skepticism: "'Any preference based on
racial or ethnic criteria must necessarily receive a most
searching examination."' Second, consistency: "[T]he standard
of review under the Equal Protection Clause is not dependent
on the race of those burdened or benefited by a particular
classification" . . . . And third, congruence: "Equal protection
analysis in the Fifth Amendment area is the same as that under
the Fourteenth Amendment." Taken together, these three
propositions lead to the conclusion that any person, of whatever
race, has the right to demand that any governmental actor
subject to the Constitution justify any racial classification
subjecting that person to unequal treatment under the strictest
judicial scrutiny.
94
Enter Barbara Grutter, "a white Michigan resident" who was denied
admission to the University of Michigan School of Law.'95 She filed suit,
demanding that the University of Michigan justify the use of race as a
criterion in its selection process pursuant to the tests set out in Croson
and Adarand Constructors.'96 In response, the Court applied the veneer
illegitimate uses of race by assuring that the legislative body is pursuing a goal important
enough to warrant use of a highly suspect tool." Id. at 493.
193. Metro Broad., Inc. v. FCC, 497 U.S. 547, 564-65 (1990), overruled by Adarand
Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200 (1995).
194. Adarand Constructors, 515 U.S. at 223-24 (second alteration in original) (citation
omitted). But see Hampton v. Mow Sun Wong, 426 U.S. 88, 100 (1976) ("Although both
Amendments require the same type of analysis . . . the two protections are not always
coextensive. Not only does the language of the two Amendments differ, but more
importantly, there may be overriding national interests which justify selective federal
legislation that would be unacceptable for an individual State." (citation omitted)
(footnote omitted)); Gilbert Paul Carrasco, Congressional Arrogation of Power: Alien
Constellation in the Galaxy of Equal Protection, 74 B.U. L. REV. 591, 604-05 (1994)
("Section Five of the Fourteenth Amendment . . . may grant Congress an overriding
interest in 'enforcing' the Fourteenth Amendment through affirmative action programs.
Congressionally sponsored affirmative action is, therefore, subject to a lower level of
scrutiny than similar action undertaken by a state or a political subdivision thereof."
(footnote omitted)); Kenneth L. Karst, The Fifth Amendment's Guarantee of Equal
Protection, 55 N.C. L. REV. 541, 560 (1977) ("In a fifth amendment equal protection case,
the basic rule of congruence with the fourteenth amendment does not require strict
scrutiny of a federal statute when the interest at stake is one that derives from federalistic
limits on the states.").
195. Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 316 (2003).
196. Id. at 316-17.
2005]
Catholic University Law Review
of its precedent: "We have held that all racial classifications imposed by
government 'must be analyzed by a reviewing court under strict scrutiny.'
This means that such classifications are constitutional only if they are
narrowly tailored to further compelling governmental interests. 1 9 7 The
Court explained that it "appl[ies] strict scrutiny to all racial classifications
to "'smoke out" illegitimate uses of race by assuring that [government] is
pursuing a goal important enough to warrant use of a highly suspect
tool"'1 98 because "'[aibsent searching judicial inquiry into the justification
for such race-based measures,' we have no way to determine what
'classifications are "benign" or "remedial" and what classifications are in
fact motivated by illegitimate notions of racial inferiority or simply racial
politics. ' ' ' 99
The veneer was transparent, however, revealing a "reflexive
deference" 2°° "antithetical to strict scrutiny."' '  The Court first focused
on the end or goal sought by the University of Michigan Law School,
concluding that the school "has a compelling interest in attaining a
diverse student body."2 2 My purpose is not to contest the validity of the
Court's conclusion, but to expose the methodology used in arriving at
this conclusion:
0 "Our scrutiny [of the law school's ends] is no less strict for taking
into account complex educational judgments in an area that lies
primarily within the expertise of the university.
' 20 3
197. Id. at 326 (quoting Adarand Constructors, 515 U.S. at 227).
198. Id. (second alteration in original) (quoting City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co.,
488 U.S. 469, 493 (1989) (plurality opinion)).
199. Id. (quoting Croson, 488 U.S. at 493 (plurality opinion)).
200. Id. at 367 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
201. Id. at 362. "The Court bases its unprecedented deference to the Law School -a
deference antithetical to strict scrutiny-on an idea of 'educational autonomy' grounded
in the First Amendment." Id. (quoting id. at 329 (majority opinion)). "The majority
grants deference to the Law School's 'assessment that diversity will, in fact, yield
educational benefits."' Id. at 365 (quoting id. at 328 (majority opinion)). "Although the
Court recites the language of our strict scrutiny analysis, its application of that review is
unprecedented in its deference." Id. at 380; see also id. at 387 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting)
(explaining that the Court used an "unprecedented display of deference under our strict
scrutiny analysis"). "The Court, however, does not apply strict scrutiny. By trying to say
otherwise, it undermines both the test and its own controlling precedents." Id. at 387
(Kennedy, J., dissenting). The Court's "[d]eference is antithetical to strict scrutiny." Id. at
394; see also Joel K. Goldstein, Beyond Bakke: Grutter-Gratz and the Promise of Brown,
48 ST. Louis U. L.J. 899, 924 (2004) ("That judgment might be correct and appropriate.
Yet it seems something of an oxymoron to claim to be using strict scrutiny even while
confessing deference to the party being scrutinized. Indeed, the predicate of strict scrutiny
is that the classification being used renders deference inappropriate." (footnote omitted)).
202. Grutter, 539 U.S. at 328.
203. Id.
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* "The Law School's educational judgment that such diversity is






* "Our holding today is in keeping with our tradition of giving a
degree of deference to a university's academic decisions, within
constitutionally prescribed limits.,
20 5
* "'[G]ood faith' on the part of a university is 'presumed' absent 'a
showing to the contrary."' 206
The Court's deferential posture toward the means chosen by the law
school to implement its goal of diversity is even more interesting than its
deference toward the goal itself. To achieve diversity, the law school
desired to have a "critical mass" of minority law students in each law
207school class. In turn, a "critical mass" serves to (a): "promote[] 'cross-
racial understanding,' [(b)] help[] to break down racial stereotypes, [(c)]
'enable[] [students] to better understand persons of different races,', 200
and (d) "encourage[] underrepresented minority students to participate
in the classroom and not feel isolated., 20 9  Diminishing racial
"stereotypes is both a crucial part of the Law School's mission, and one
that it cannot accomplish with only token numbers of minority
students., 2'0 Here the Court deferred to the law school's determination,
"based on its experience and expertise, that a 'critical mass' of
underrepresented minorities is necessary to further its compelling
interest in securing the educational benefits of a diverse student body.,
211
Even if the end-diversity-is compelling and the broad means
chosen- achieving a critical mass-is necessary to achieve that end, the
law school still retains the burden of establishing that its actual
implementation is "'narrowly framed to accomplish that purpose.'
21 2
Narrow tailoring ensures "'that there is little or no possibility that the
motive for the classification was illegitimate racial prejudice or
stereotype.' 213  A quota system fails constitutional muster as not
214narrowly tailored . A nonquota system that does not evaluate
204. Id. (emphasis added).
205. Id. (emphasis added).
206. Id. at 330 (quoting Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 318-19
(1978)).
207. Id. at 329.
208. Id. at 330 (fifth alteration in original).
209. Id. at 318.
210. Id. at 333.
211. Id.
212. Id. (quoting Shaw v. Hunt, 517 U.S. 899, 908 (1996), rev'd sub nom. Hunt v.
Cromartie, 526 U.S. 541 (1999)).
213. Id. (quoting City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 493 (1989)
(plurality opinion)).
214. Id. at 334.
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applicants as individuals will meet a similar fate.2 5 In other words, "an
applicant's race or ethnicity [cannot be] the defining feature of his or her
application. The importance of this individualized consideration in the
context of a race-conscious admissions program is paramount., 21 6 Given
this framework, the Court should have used strict scrutiny to test and
probe the law school's racially sensitive plus factor to smoke out the
possibility that the admission policy was in actuality an illegitimate covert
quota system or in some other way failed to be narrowly tailored to the
compelling goal of diversity. But, the Court backed away from such a
searching inquiry, saying that it needed to calibrate its inquiry for the
special context of diversity in higher education.2 7
The dissents powerfully expose the Court's language of strict scrutiny
with its narrow tailoring as mere empty rhetoric. As Chief Justice
Rehnquist pointed out, several troubling questions remain unanswered
and would require a convincing explanation from the law school before
one could rationally conclude that the school's policy is narrowly tailored
to the stated goal of diversity.219
* The law school never offered an explanation as to why it needed to
admit between ninety-one and 108 African-Americans to achieve a
"critical mass" while it only needed to admit between forty-seven
and fifty-six Hispanics and thirteen to nineteen Native Americans
219to achieve critical masses for those two groups.
* The law school never explained why there was such a strong
correlation between the percentage of applicants in each minority
group and the percentage of each group who were offered
210
admission.
215. Id. at 336-37.
216. Id. at 337.
217. Id. at 334-35.
218. See id. at 386 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting) ("The Law School has offered no
explanation for its actual admissions practices and, unexplained, we are bound to conclude
that the Law School has managed its admissions program, not to achieve a 'critical mass,'
but to extend offers of admission to members of selected minority groups in proportion to
their statistical representation in the applicant pool.").
219. Id. at 381-82 ("If the Law School is admitting between 91 and 108 African-
Americans in order to achieve 'critical mass,' thereby preventing African-American
students from feeling 'isolated or like spokespersons for their race,' one would think that a
number of the same order of magnitude would be necessary to accomplish the same
purpose for Hispanics and Native Americans. . . . Respondents have never offered any
race-specific arguments explaining why significantly more individuals from one
underrepresented minority group are needed in order to achieve 'critical mass' or further
student body diversity." (citations omitted) (footnote omitted)).
220. Id. at 383 ("[T]he correlation between the percentage of the Law School's pool of
applicants who are members of the three minority groups and the percentage of the
admitted applicants who are members of these same groups is far too precise to be
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* The law school never explained its disparate treatment of
individuals among minority groups.22 '
* The law school never explained how it gave individual review to
each applicant for the final twenty percent of the offers it made
given its desire to obtain a critical mass of minorities.
* In light of its precedent in United States v. Virginia, the Court
failed to articulate why the State of Michigan has a compelling
interest in maintaining an elite law school.224 In other words, the
Court failed to explain why the law school should not be forced to
choose between its desire to be elite and its commitment to
diversity.1
25
dismissed as merely the result of the school paying 'some attention to [the] numbers."'
(second alteration in original)); id. ("[T]he Law School's disparate admissions practices
with respect to these minority groups demonstrate that its alleged goal of 'critical mass' is
simply a sham.").
221. Id. at 382 ("For example, in 2000, 12 Hispanics who scored between a 159-160 on
the LSAT and earned a GPA of 3.00 or higher applied for admission and only 2 were
admitted. Meanwhile, 12 African-Americans in the same range of qualifications applied
for admission and all 12 were admitted.").
222. Id. at 389 (Kennedy, J., dissenting). Justice Kennedy explained:
About 80% to 85% of the places in the entering class are given to applicants in
the upper range of the Law School Admissions Test scores and grades. An
applicant with these credentials likely will be admitted without consideration of
race or ethnicity. With respect to the remaining 15% to 20% of the seats, race is
likely outcome determinative for many members of minority groups. That is
where the competition becomes tight and where any given applicant's chance of
admission is far smaller if he or she lacks minority status. At this point the
numerical concept of critical mass has the real potential to compromise
individual review.
Id.
223. 518 U.S. 515, 545-46 (1996). After noting the District Court's findings that "'some
aspects of the [school's] distinctive method would be altered' if women were admitted
[and] [t]hus, 'sufficient constitutional justification' had been shown . . . 'for continuing
[VMI's] single-sex policy,"' id. at 524 (first and fifth alterations in original) (citations
omitted) (quoting United States v. Virginia, 766 F. Supp. 1407, 1412-13 (W.D. Va. 1991)),
the Court nonetheless held that the state "'has fallen far short of establishing the
"exceedingly persuasive justification,"' that must be the solid base for any gender-defined
classification." Id. at 546 (citation omitted) (quoting Miss. Univ. for Women v. Hogan,
458 U.S. 718, 731 (1982)).
224. Grutter, 539 U.S. at 356 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
Justice Thomas noted that "[r]acial discrimination is not a permissible solution to the self-
inflicted wounds of this elitist admissions policy." Id. at 350.
225. Id. at 361 ("The interest in remaining elite and exclusive that the majority thinks
so obviously critical requires the use of admissions 'standards' that, in turn, create the Law
School's 'need' to discriminate on the basis of race."). Without providing reasons, the
Court concluded that "[n]arrow tailoring does [not] require . . . a university to choose
between maintaining a reputation for excellence or fulfilling a commitment to provide
educational opportunities to members of all racial groups." Id. at 339 (majority opinion).
Noting the number of states without public law schools (five) and the number of states
20051
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* The Court failed to articulate why it took away the University of
Michigan's incentive to seek race-neutral alternatives for achieving
the desired critical mass of minority students . 226
The evidence is overwhelming that, despite its protestations to the
contrary, the Court did not use traditional strict scrutiny in reviewing the
University of Michigan Law School's race-based admissions policy.
Feigning strict scrutiny, the Court, by recalibrating contextually, engaged
in a form of ad hoc balancing. The Court balanced the individual's
constitutionally recognized right to be treated by the state as a person
and not merely as a member of a racial group2 7 against the state's
asserted interest in obtaining a racially diverse class without forfeiting its
elite status.22 8  "Context matters" says the Court.229  The context
contained three factors that tipped the scales away from race neutrality.
23 ~21First, this case, like Plyler230 and Brown v. Board of Education, involved
without elite public law schools (forty-six) together with the facts that less than a third of
the law school's students are from Michigan and less than a fifth will stay in Michigan,
Justice Thomas concluded that "there is no pressing public necessity in maintaining a
public law school at all and, it follows, certainly not an elite law school." Id. at 357-60
(Thomas, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). According to Thomas, "the Law
School should be forced to choose between its classroom aesthetic and its exclusionary
admissions system-it cannot have it both ways." Id. at 361. Justice Scalia found
particularly unanswerable [this] central point: that the allegedly "compelling
state interest" at issue here [was] not the incremental "educational benefit" that
emanate[d] from the fabled "critical mass" of minority students, but rather
Michigan's interest in maintaining a "prestige" law school whose normal
admissions standards disproportionately exclude blacks and other minorities. If
that is a compelling state interest, everything is.
Id. at 347 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
226. Id. at 362 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) ("[T]he Court
ignores the fact that other top law schools have succeeded in meeting their aesthetic
demands without racial discrimination."). "The sky has not fallen at Boalt Hall at the
University of California, Berkeley, for example," where race-based admissions factors are
prohibited. Id. at 367. "Apparently the Law School cannot be counted on to be as
resourceful." Id. The Court acknowledges that "[u]niversities in California, Florida, and
Washington State, where racial preferences in admissions are prohibited by state law, are
currently engaged in experimenting with a wide variety of alternative approaches.
Universities in other States can and should draw on the most promising aspects of these
race-neutral alternatives as they develop." Id. at 342 (majority opinion). But, the Court
provides them no incentive to do so, at least for the next twenty-five years. See id. at 343.
227. See Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 298-99 (1978) (plurality
opinion); De Funis v. Odegaard, 416 U.S. 312, 343 (1974) (Douglas, J., dissenting) ("A
segregated admissions process creates suggestions of stigma and caste no less than a
segregated classroom, and in the end it may produce that result despite its contrary
intentions.").
228. Grutter, 539 U.S. at 328.
229. Id. at 327.
230. 457 U.S. 202, 205 (1982). But see Rodriquez v. San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v.
Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 4-5 (1973).
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education; university education to be specific. And, the Court finds in
the First Amendment a measure of "educational autonomy," concluding
that "universities occupy a special niche in our constitutional
tradition., 23 2 Second, the benefits of a diverse class "are not theoretical
but real [because the] global marketplace can only be developed through
exposure to widely diverse people, cultures, ideas, and viewpoints.,
233
And third, "[i]n order to cultivate a set of leaders with legitimacy in the
eyes of the citizenry, it is necessary that the path to leadership be visibly
open to talented and qualified individuals of every race and ethnicity.,
23 4
Balancing these interests against the harm visited upon a person deemed
unworthy of admission based largely on a racial criterion, the Court
deferred to the law school and concluded that this "dangerous" tool of
racial classification would be allowed for the next twenty-five years.2 35
231. 347 U.S. 483, 493 (1954) ("Today [education] is a principal instrument in
awakening the child to cultural values, in preparing him for later professional training, and
in helping him to adjust normally to his environment. In these days, it is doubtful that any
child may reasonably be expected to succeed in life if he is denied the opportunity of an
education.").
232. Gruter, 539 U.S. at 329. The dissent wondered why the deference given to
Michigan Law School because of its standing as an elite educational institution was not
extended to the Virginia Military Institute in United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515 (1996).
See Grutter, 539 U.S. at 366 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) ("[I]n
Virginia, where the standard of review dictated that greater flexibility be granted to VMI's
educational policies than the Law School deserves here, this Court gave no deference.").
233. Id. at 330 (majority opinion). But see id. at 347 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part) ("If properly considered an 'educational benefit' at all, it is surely not
one that is either uniquely relevant to law school or uniquely 'teachable' in a formal
educational setting."). For a discussion/debate regarding ideological and religious
diversity in law schools, see Brian Leiter, The Law School Observer, 6 GREEN BAG 2D
421, 421-22 (2003) (defending the ideological balance by making an analogy between the
lack of alchemists on science faculties and the lack of religious conservatives on law
faculties), and John 0. McGinnis & Matthew Schwartz, Conservatives Need Not Apply,
WALL. ST. J., Apr. 1, 2003, at A14 ("America splits evenly between the GOP and
Democrats, but 74% of the [law] professors contribute primarily to Democrats. Only 16%
do so to Republicans.").
234. Grutter, 539 U.S. at 332. "Effective participation by members of all racial and
ethnic groups in the civic life of our Nation is essential if the dream of one Nation,
indivisible, is to be realized." Id.
235. See id. at 343. In a further sign of deference, unexpected in the application of
strict scrutiny, the Court said: "We take the Law School at its word that it would 'like
nothing better than to find a race-neutral admissions formula' and will terminate its race-
conscious admissions program as soon as practible." Id.
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C. Lawrence v. Texas
Lower courts had split over whether homosexuals should be classified
as a discrete or quasi-discrete and insular minority."' Given its
reluctance to add additional groups to this preferred status,237 the
Supreme Court dodged the issue, using ad hoc balancing-or heightened
rational basis-in the equal protection context to review and strike down
a Colorado constitutional amendment that prohibited state entities from
granting a privileged protected status to homosexuals.
In Lawrence v. Texas,39 the Court expanded the use of ad hoc
balancing to the substantive due process arena. Under the guise of
rational basis review, the Court overruled Bowers v. Hardwick,24 °
concluding that participation in homosexual sodomy is a protected
liberty interest. Under the old two-tiered system, liberty interests were
divided into two categories: fundamental rights and the infinite numberS• 242
of other claims of liberty. Upon determining that the right at stake was
fundamental, the Court would protect the right, insulating it from the
political process. The state could only interfere with the protected
liberty if it proved that its restriction was necessary to achieve a
236. See, e.g., Watkins v. U.S. Army, 875 F.2d 699, 724-28 (9th Cir. 1989) (holding that
homosexuals are a suspect class); Equality Found. of Greater Cincinnati, Inc. v. City of
Cincinnati, 860 F. Supp. 417, 436-40 (S.D. Ohio 1994) (analyzing whether homosexuals are
a suspect class and ultimately determining that the group is a quasi-suspect class), rev'd, 54
F.3d 261 (6th Cir. 1995), vacated, 518 U.S. 1001 (1996); Dean v. District of Columbia, 653
A.2d 307,349-51 (D.C. 1995).
237. See supra notes 107-27 and accompanying text (discussing Cleburne).
238. See Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 620, 624 (1996); see also Richard F. Duncan,
Wigstock and the Kulturkampf" Supreme Court Storytelling, The Culture War, and Romer
v. Evans, 72 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 345, 355 n.54 (1997) (discussing the effect Romer
might have on forcing organizations to abandon their conscience to accommodate
homosexuals); Lino A. Graglia, Romer v. Evans: The People Foiled Again by the
Constitution, 68 U. COLO. L. REV. 409, 416 (1997) ("To the extent that the State and its
municipalities gave homosexuals special protection, Amendment 2 merely returned the
State to a position of neutrality by removing that special protection."); Robert F. Nagel,
Playing Defense in Colorado, FIRST THINGS, May 1998, at 34, 34-38 (examining the
motives behind those who supported Colorado's Amendment 2 in order to determine the
true purpose of the Amendment); Steven D. Smith, Conciliating Hatred, FIRST THINGS,
June/July 2004, at 17, 21 ("Moral disapproval of conduct, such as homosexual acts, is
equated with hostility toward and hatred of persons who engage in that conduct, and even
of persons with a proclivity to engage in it, whether they actually do so or not."). But see
Brief of Laurence H. Tribe et al. as Amici Curiae in Support of Respondents at 1, Romer
v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996) (No. 94-1039), 1995 WL 17008432 (arguing that Colorado's
Amendment 2 is a "per se" constitutional violation). Thus, automatic strict scrutiny would
apply.
239. 539 U.S. 558 (2003).
240. 478 U.S. 186 (1986), overruled by Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003).
241. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 578.
242. See id. at 593.
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compelling state interest. 243 In all other cases-dealing with the myriad
non-protected liberty interests-the Court would defer to the political
process, striking down the state's action only if the challenger proved
that the state was not acting in a way that was rationally related to the
state's legitimate ends.244
The Court changed its methodology in Lawrence in two significant
ways. First, it used a heightened form of rational basis review rather than
strict scrutiny to strike down Texas's sodomy prohibition. Viewing the
community's moral foundation as either irrational or an illegitimate basis
for state action, the Court summoned Cleburne's rhetorical legacy with
phrases such as "born of animosity, "stigma, ' '247 "demeans the lives of
homosexual persons,, 248  and "[t]he State cannot demean their
existence" 241 to conclude that "Itihe Texas statute furthers no legitimate
state interest which can justify its intrusion into the personal and private
life of the individual., 250 Traditional rational basis would have led the
Court to defer to the state's policy choices when exercising its recognized
power to regulate for the benefit of the community's health, safety, and
morals. 25 1 "The Texas statute undeniably seeks to further the belief of its
citizens that certain forms of sexual behavior are 'immoral and
unacceptable'-the same interest furthered by criminal laws against
fornication, bigamy, adultery, adult incest, bestiality, and obscenity.,
252
243. See id.
244. See supra notes 76-80 and accompanying text.
245. See Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 578.
246. Id. at 574.
247. Id. at 575.
248. Id.
249. Id. at 578.
250. Id.
251. See, e.g., S.C. State Highway Dep't v. Barnwell Bros., Inc., 303 U.S. 177, 190-91
(1938); W. Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379, 391 (1937) ("[T]he liberty safeguarded
[by the due process clause] is liberty in a social organization which requires the protection
of law against the evils which menace the health, safety, morals and welfare of the people.
Liberty under the Constitution is thus necessarily subject to the restraints of due process,
and regulation which is reasonable in relation to its subject and is adopted in the interests
of the community is due process."); Bowman v. Chi. & Nw. Ry. Co., 125 U.S. 465, 471
(1888) ("The police powers comprehend all those general powers of internal regulation
necessary to secure peace, good order, health, comfort, morals, and quiet of all persons,
and the protection of all property in the State.").
252. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 599 (citation omitted) (Scalia, J., dissenting). "State laws
against bigamy, same-sex marriage, adult incest, prostitution, masturbation, adultery,
fornication, bestiality, and obscenity are likewise sustainable only in light of Bowers'
validation of laws based on moral choices. . . . The impossibility of distinguishing
homosexuality from other traditional 'morals' offenses is precisely why Bowers rejected
the rational basis challenge." Id. at 590; see also 1 WILL DURANT, THE STORY OF
CIVILIZATION: OUR ORIENTAL HERITAGE 30 (1935); 2 MICHEL FOUCAULT, THE USE
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But, at least with respect to homosexual conduct, the Court concluded
that "'the fact that the governing majority in a State has traditionally
viewed a particular practice as immoral is not a sufficient reason for
upholding a law prohibiting the practice." '23  It remains to be seen
whether this conclusion "effectively decrees the end of all morals
legislation, 254 although its logic tends strongly in that direction. More
likely, the Court will not follow its own logic. Instead, it will use its new
found freedom of ad hoc balancing to pick and choose the liberty
interests that it will protect against government and communal
encroachment.
Second, in resurrecting Casey's mystery passage, Lawrence jettisoned
the methodology of earlier substantive due process cases, which had
attempted to ascertain whether the restricted liberty belonged to a small
class of fundamental rights deeply rooted in our history and tradition.255
It is no coincidence that these two moves-toward ad hoc balancing and
toward judicial protection of certain liberty interests not labeled
fundamental-occur at the same point in history. The use of ad hoc
balancing provides the Court some elbow room, allowing it to overturn
government action on a case-by-case basis while leaving it free to uphold
the government's action when government flexibility is deemed
desirable, all without rigidly identifying, categorizing, and separating
protected from unprotected liberty interests. With the increased
flexibility inherent in ad hoc balancing, the line between protected and
unprotected freedom can be much more porous.
The logic of the Court's modern substantive due process cases had
been problematic from its inception. In a fit of thinly disguised judicial
legerdemain, the Court in Griswold v. Connecticut 256 pretended that it
was not engaged in substantive due process at all, suggesting, instead,
OF PLEASURE 15 (Robert Hurley trans., Random House 1985); Michael A. Scaperlanda,
Kulturkampf in the Backwaters: Homosexuality and Immigration Law, 11 WIDENER J.
PUB. L. 475, 475-76 (2002) ("Across cultures and throughout history, the answer to this
question has been yes. Even today, a vast majority of 'tolerant' Americans would agree
that the state can go beyond regulating or expressing disfavor and legitimately prohibit
253. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 577 (quoting Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 216 (1986)
(Stevens, J., dissenting), overruled by Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003)) (holding
that "Justice Stevens' analysis ... should control here").
254. Id. at 599 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
255. See supra note 13; see also Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 710-16 (1997)
(examining the history of assisted suicide); Bowers, 478 U.S. at 196-97 (Burger, C.J.,
concurring) (recounting the history of homosexuality); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 129-47
(1973) (describing the history of abortion).
256. 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
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that it was teasing penumbras and emanations from the Bill of Rights.257
In Eisenstadt v. Baird,258 the Court seemed to suggest that freedom to
fornicate is deeply rooted in our nation's history.258 And, in Roe, the
Court, despite the historical record, concluded that the fundamental right
to privacy was broad enough to encompass a mother's right to terminate
her pregnancy, leading the late John Hart Ely to describe Roe as "a
very bad decision .... It is bad because it is bad constitutional law, or
rather because it is not constitutional law., 261 Having weathered a storm, 262
of criticism and attempts to overturn or limit Roe, the Court has
established itself, at least for the time being, as the chief purveyor of not
only our constitutional law but also our constitutional ideals.
The Court faced a dilemma, however, in its quest to expand
constitutionally protected freedoms because it could not convincingly
expand this list using the fairly strict formula of the fundamental rights
regime. If it were to attempt to give effect to the desires of "persons in
every generation [to] invoke [the Constitution's] principles in their own
search for greater freedom,"264 its criteria could not be the old backward
looking criteria, which asked if the freedom was deeply rooted in our
history and tradition. Instead, it would need forward looking criterion,
using contemporary sources to gage the direction of freedom's future.
Rejecting the requirement that a liberty interest be "deeply rooted in our
257. Id. at 484. For a more honest assessment, see Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 515-22
(1961) (Douglas, J., dissenting). In Griswold, the Court wanted to distance itself from
Lochner. See Griswold, 381 U.S. at 482 ("We do not sit as a super-legislature to determine
the wisdom, need, and propriety of laws that touch economic problems, business affairs, or
social conditions."). But, by engaging in blatant policy-making untethered to the
Constitution itself in Griswold and subsequent substantive due process cases, the Court
appeared unconcerned that it was stripping the citizenry of its vital liberty in self-
governance. See Scaperlanda, supra note 139, at 43-44.
258. 405 U.S. 438 (1972).
259. Id. at 453 ("[W]hatever the rights of the individual to access to contraceptives
may be, the rights must be the same for the unmarried and the married alike.").
260. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 154 (1973).
261. John Hart Ely, Wages of Crying Wolf. A Comment on Roe v. Wade, 82 YALE L.J.
920, 947 (1973) (footnotes omitted).
262. See ABORTION AND THE CONSTITUTION app. 1, at 265-68 (Dennis J. Horan,
Edward R. Grant, Paige C. Cunningham eds., 1987) (summarizing Supreme Court
decisions on abortion); Ely, supra note 261, at 947-49.
263. See Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 868 (1992) ("Their
belief in themselves as such a people is not readily separable from their understanding of
the Court invested with the authority to decide their constitutional cases and speak before
all others for their constitutional ideals. If the Court's legitimacy should be undermined,
then, so would the country be in its very ability to see itself through its constitutional
ideals. The Court's concern with legitimacy is not for the sake of the Court, but for the
sake of the Nation to which it is responsible.").
264. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 579 (2003) (O'Connor, J., concurring).
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265legal tradition" before it receives heightened judicial protection, the
Court concluded "that our laws and traditions in the past half century are
of most relevance here."266 Referring to decisions of the European Court
of Human Rights, various state courts, and scholarly criticism of Bowers,
the Court found "an emerging awareness" that private sexual contact
between adults ought to be among the activities receiving constitutional267268
protection.267  This double-switch, to use a baseball metaphor, has
poised the Court for a new generation of constitutional jurisprudence as
the Court begins to work through the implications of "its famed sweet-
mystery-of-life passage.,
269
IV. CONCLUSION: JUDICIAL LICENSURE AND THE COURT'S FAIRLY
EXPLICIT ANTHROPOLOGY
The shift toward ad hoc balancing would lead, according to Justice
Marshall, to an "unaccountab[ility] for [the Court's] decisions employing,
or refusing to employ, particularly searching scrutiny., 270 More recently,
Justice Scalia reached a similar conclusion: "[T]he Court simply describes
petitioners' conduct as 'an exercise of their liberty'-which it
undoubtedly is-and proceeds to apply an unheard-of form of rational-
basis review that will have far-reaching implications beyond this case.
27 1
265. Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 722 (1997).
266. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 571-72.
267. Id. at 571-73.
268. The Court is using a double-switch by moving from categorical to ad hoc
balancing and moving from protecting fundamental rights deeply rooted in our nation's
history and tradition to protecting rights birthed from an "emerging awareness" in Europe
and among American intellectuals that certain freedoms ought to receive judicial
protection.
269. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 588 (Scalia, J., dissenting). Justice Scalia elaborated:
[The mystery passage] "casts some doubt" upon either the totality of our
jurisprudence or else (presumably the right answer) nothing at all. I have never
heard of a law that attempted to restrict one's "right to define" certain concepts;
and if the passage calls into question the government's power to regulate actions
based on one's self-defined "concept of existence, etc.," it is the passage that ate
the rule of law.
Id.
270. City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 460 (1985) (Marshall,
J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part).
271. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 586 (Scalia, J., dissenting). For initial views from scholarly
commentators, see Epstein, supra note 80, at 77-78 ("[T]he combined impact of [Lawrence
and Grutter], no matter how construed, shakes the structure of modern constitutional law
to its intellectual roots .... When the dust settles, the best explanation for what the Court
has done is to revive, in the area of social rights, much of the traditional view of the
somewhat misnamed laissez-faire constitutionalism."), Wilson Huhn, The Jurisprudential
Revolution: Unlocking Human Potential in Grutter and Lawrence, 12 WM. & MARY BILL
RTS. J. 65, 67 (2003) ("This approach to interpreting the Constitution promises to achieve
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To develop a roadmap, even if only a crude one, of where the Court
might be driving its equal protection and substantive due process
jurisprudence as it frees itself from the limitations self-imposed by
categorical balancing, it is important to delve beneath the surface and
explore the anthropological vision fueling its engine. As Professor John
Coughlin has said: "[E]very system of law reflects certain assumptions
about what it means to be human. The law interacts with these
anthropological assumptions, with the result that, over the course of
time, the law influences society's understanding of what a human being is
and ought to be., 272  Casey's mystery passage provides the clearest
articulation of this Court's jurisprudential anthropology. To repeat the
now familiar mantra: "At the heart of liberty is the right to define one's
own concept of existence, of meaning, of the universe, and of the mystery
of human life. Beliefs about these matters could not define the attributes
of personhood were they formed under compulsion of the State. 2 3 For
a brief moment the Court minimized this language as a source of
constitutional meaning. Judge Reinhardt and the Ninth Circuit had
relied on the mystery passage to strike down Washington's ban on
assisted suicide. 4 In overturning the Ninth Circuit and referring to the
mystery passage, the Court said: "That many of the rights and liberties
protected by the Due Process Clause sound in personal autonomy does
not warrant the sweeping conclusion that any and all important, intimate,
and personal decisions are so protected .... 2 75
In light of Glucksberg, was the mystery passage "merely reckless dicta,
[the] rhetorical flourish[] of justices who let their inner poet or inner
philosopher out to play from time to time"?2 76 One astute commentator
thought not, reminding that "dicta have a way of insinuating themselves
a more universal understanding of liberty and equality and a more comprehensive
embodiment of the principles expressed in the Declaration of Independence."), and
Darren Lenard Hutchinson, The Majoritarian Difficulty: Affirmative Action, Sodomy, and
Supreme Court Politics, 23 LAW & INEQ. 1, 4 (2005) (arguing that Lawrence and Grutter
"fortify, rather than aim to dismantle, social hierarchies of race, sexuality, class, and
gender").
272. John J. Coughlin, Pope John Paul II and the Dignity of the Human Being, 27
HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 65, 74-75 (2003) (footnote omitted).
273. Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 851 (1992). One observer
recently commented that "[t]he 'sweet mystery' passage with which Kennedy concludes
his privacy discussion is an embarrassing muddle." Richard D. Mohr, The Shag-A-Delic
Supreme Court: "Anal Sex, " "Mystery, " "Destiny, " and the "Transcendent" in Lawrence v.
Texas, 10 CARDOZO WOMEN'S L.J. 365,379 (2004).
274. Compassion in Dying v. Washington, 79 F.3d 790, 813 (9th Cir. 1996), rev'd sub
nom. Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702 (1997).
275. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 727 (citation omitted).
276. Richard J. Neuhaus, Rebuilding the Civil Public Square, 44 LoY. L. REV. 119, 125
(1998).
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into later jurisprudence. . . . I believe such dicta deserve the closest
attention, for they reveal the underlying assumptions of the Court-or at
least of some on the Court-about the relationship between law and
moral judgment. 2 77 Close attention was deserved because in Lawrence,
the mystery passage, with its anthropological assumptions, took center
stage in the Court's reasoning. 278
What are these anthropological assumptions? The mystery passage
provides us with our new national creed,279 our constitutionally mandated
public "creation story"-or, more accurately, "existence story"-in
which each individual is an autonomous self-creator. In this story, there
is no objectively knowable origin of humanity, no objectively knowable
purpose to life, no objectively knowable personal and communal goods,
and no objectively knowable destination toward which those goods
should tend. In creating and recreating, defining and redefining the
self,2s° the individual is free to adopt or reject the received wisdom from
history, culture, family, and community. This new creed serves, for the
time being, the cause of the secularist liberal state. T8
277. Id.
278. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 573-74 (2003). The
"deeply entrenched" Casey anthropology serves as the foundation for, and does
much of the important work in, our communities' public arguments about moral
questions. We-or, at least, many of us-think about the person, and about her
rights and duties, and about her very nature, in Casey's terms, and the fact that
Casey's anthropology provides the scaffolding for our arguments cannot help but
affect the conclusions we reach and solutions we offer.
Richard W. Garnett, Christian Witness, Moral Anthropology, and the Death Penalty, 17
NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL'Y 541, 555 (2003).
279. Our old national creed was reflected in The Declaration of Independence: "We
hold these truths to be self-evident: that all men are created equal; that they are endowed,
by their Creator, with certain unalienable rights; that among these are life, liberty, and the
pursuit of happiness." THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 2 (U.S. 1776).
280. Some question whether this process of authentic self-creation is even possible.
See, e.g., John Garvey, Control Freaks, 47 DRAKE L. REV. 1, 6 (1998) ("Casey assumes
that there are no givens in life-that our persons are our own creations, and always open
to recreation .... It is not at all clear, though, that we have this capacity or that it can do
the work its proponents assign to it .... In fact, some say, it is [our preferences, desires,
and appetites] that drive us, not we them." (footnotes omitted)); RICHARD RORTY,
CONTINGENCY, IRONY AND SOLIDARITY 87 (1989) ("[Njonintellectuals would ... be
commonsensically nominalist and historicist. So they would see themselves as contingent
through and through, without feeling any particular doubts about the contingencies they
happened to be.... They would feel no more need to answer the question[] 'Why are you
liberal?' . . . than the average sixteenth-century Christian felt to answer the question 'Why
are you a Christian?').
281. 1 use the term "secularist" as opposed to "secular" to describe the liberal project
espoused by Casey and other recent Supreme Court decisions because the "secularist"
state marginalizes the potential public significance of peoples' religious beliefs. A
"secular" state, by contrast, does not adopt and impose a particular religious orthodoxy,
but it provides room in the public square for a robust pluralism in which people of any or
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Paradoxically, the mystery passage's anthropological assumptions
destroy the intellectual and moral foundations of the liberal project itself.
In a world of self-definers and self-creators, there is no accessible
"criterion for wrongness."'2 82 As Rorty persuasively argues, insisting "on
contingency, and our consequent opposition to ideas like 'essence,'
'nature,' and 'foundation,' makes it impossible for us to retain the notion
that some actions and attitudes are naturally 'inhuman.' 2 13 In this world,
where the public concept of the human being is very thin, we must
abandon "the idea that liberalism could be justified, and Nazi or Marxist
enemies of liberalism refuted, by ... argument[]."284 Liberalism itself, as
Maritain noted a half century ago, is susceptible to its own form of
illiberal totalitarianism. 8 ' Today we witness the death of freedom for
some in the name of freedom for others. Nurses have to resign their
positions because they are not free to follow their consciences when it
286comes to refusing to dispense the morning-after pill abortifacient .
Doctors and lawyers are forced against conscience to engage in activities
deemed morally objectionable in the name of the patient/client's
no faith can bring their whole selves, including their core, to bear in their participation in
the public life of the nation. The "liberal" project can be defined as
a world in which the right to "be oneself," to choose oneself, is placed in a special
and privileged position; in which expression is favored over self-control; in which
achievement is valued over inborn or inherited traits and in which achievement is
defined in subjective, personal terms, rather than in objective, social terms.
LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, THE REPUBLIC OF CHOICE 3 (1990) (emphasis omitted).
Neuhaus explains the ramifications of the secularist state built upon Casey's anthropology
and logic:
In its own intellectually bumbling way, the notorious mystery passage of Casey
and the accompanying opinion pose the radical proposition that our polity has
but two players. On the one hand is the autonomous, unencumbered individual,
and on the other is the Court, the sole source of governmental legitimacy and
ultimate authority.
Neuhaus, supra note 276, at 131.
282. RORTY, supra note 280, at 20, 75.
283. Id. at 189.
284. Id. at 53.
285. JACQUES MARITAIN, THE PERSON AND THE COMMON GOOD 91-93 (John J.
Fitzgerald trans., 1947). The specter of illiberality rears its ugly head in Bruce Ackerman's
early work. See ACKERMAN, supra note 51, at 79-81 ("The rights of the talking ape are
more secure than those of the human vegetable."). For my critique of Ackerman, see
Michael A. Scaperlanda, Immigration Justice: A Catholic Christian Perspective, 1 J. OF
CATHOLIC SOC. THOUGHT 535, 543 (2004). Professor James Dwyer advocates stripping
parents of their right to raise their children, placing ultimate parental responsibility in Big
Brother. See JAMES G. DWYER, RELIGIOUS SCHOOLS V. CHILDREN'S RIGHTS (1998);
JAMES G. DWYER, VOUCHERS WITHIN REASON (2001). For my review of Vouchers
Within Reason, see Michael A. Scaperlanda, Producing Trousered Apes in Dwyer's
Totalitarian State, 7 TEX. REV. L. & POL. 175 (2002).
286. See Jannell McGrew, Contraception Policy Criticized, MONTGOMERY
ADVERTISER, June 26, 2004, at lA.
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2817freedom. Catholic Charities is forced, against conscience and religious
freedom, to include contraceptive coverage in its health care package for
employees2 m
Without a foundation-without a thick conception of the human
person-the judiciary will "feel, 289 its way through substantive due
process and equal protection cases. 29 And, by moving toward a system
of ad hoc balancing, the Court has maximized its ability to govern on the
great cultural questions of our generation from its liberal egalitarian
anthropology. "[L]iberal egalitarians care about human freedoms.
People should be free to pursue their own projects . . . . In addition,
liberal egalitarians are committed to equal opportunity [and] keep[ing]
actual economic, social and political inequalities as small as possible
.... ,,29 Lawrence depicts the Court's liberal tack while Grutter depicts
its egalitarian tack.
Even if it is able to sustain an aura of legitimacy for its self-proclaimed
role as cultural architect, the Court's Casey jurisprudence is not viable in
the long term. History teaches that without an adequate anthropology,
287. Eleanor W. Myers, "Simple Truths" About Moral Education, 45 AM. U. L. REV.
823, 825-26 (1996) ("The bar's approach implies an ethic of obedience rather than
personal responsibility. It discourages students from understanding that they have
significant power to choose and create a legal identity that is congenial with their personal
orientation and their values." (footnote omitted)). See generally Judith F. Daar, A Clash
at the Bedside: Patient Autonomy v. A Physician's Professional Conscience, 44 HASTINGS
L.J. 1241 (1993).
288. See Catholic Charities of Sacramento, Inc. v. Superior Court, 85 P.3d 67, 73 (Cal.),
cert. denied, 125 S. Ct. 53 (2004).
289. "Feel" as opposed to "think critically and analytically." See Roe v. Wade, 410
U.S. 113, 153 (1973) ("This right of privacy, whether it be founded in the Fourteenth
Amendment's concept of personal liberty and restrictions upon state action, as we feel it
is, or... in the Ninth Amendment's reservation of rights to the people, is broad enough to
encompass a woman's decision whether or not to terminate her pregnancy.").
290. The Court's starting point, as seen through the prism of the Court's plenary
power doctrine in the alienage jurisprudence, seems to be Walzerian particularist rather
than universalist liberalism. See Bosniak, supra note 32, at 1068 ("Walzer's analysis of the
political community's 'membership sphere' has become the paradigm organizing concept
for virtually all normative treatments of immigration law and policy, whether or not the
substance of his views is actually embraced."). Employing a Walzerian particularist
position, the Court grants rights only to those who are members and partial members.
Walzer's theories contrast those of the universalist or cosmopolitist who believe in a global
view of rights. Thus, rights are not based on membership, but rather on status as a rights
bearing human being. See, e.g., ACKERMAN, supra note 51, at 4-5, 100.
291. Joseph H. Carens, Migration and Morality: A Liberal Egalitarian Perspective, in
FREE MOVEMENT 25, 26 (Brian Barry & Robert E. Goodin eds., 1992) (footnote
omitted).
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grounded in something beyond our own self-creation, our quest for
292liberty will give way to darker impulses embedded in human nature.
What is the alternative to the Court's current anthropology? My
answer is that we should take a fresh look at our founding document and
its implications for the future of liberty and equality in America. Its
anthropology is summed up in words that every school child learns: "We
hold these truths to be self-evident; that all men are created equal; that
they are endowed, by their Creator, with certain unalienable rights; that
among these are life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness., 293 The great
challenge for the next generation will be to bring the Declaration's
anthropology to life in a truly pluralistic liberal state that recognizes and
privileges the Declaration's thick conception of the human person.
292. This certainly is the lesson of the twentieth century with Stalinist Soviet Union
and Nazi Germany.
293. THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 2 (U.S. 1776).
2005]
Catholic University Law Review
